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BOOK REVIEWS

THE DANGERS OF POLITICAL LAW
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW.

By Robert H. Bork. New York: The Free Press, 1989. Pp. 355.
Senator On-in G. Hatch
Throughout his confirmation hearings, Judge Robert H. Bork
lionized the virtues of neutral judicial decisions based on the Constitution's original meaning. His testimony warned against judicial decisions based on politics rather than on the words of the law. With
the political defeat of Judge Bork, his opponents heralded the demise of original meaning jurisprudence. Judge Bork's defeat, however, proved him correct: American institutions, including courts,
have strayed from the original meaning of the Nation's Constitution
and laws.
Judge Bork has devoted much of his life to decrying the danger
ofjudicial policy making. This lifelong record proved his defeat in
the unfettered fray of Senate politics. Ironically, the defeat also
proved Judge Bork's thesis.
If, as Judge Bork advocates, judges must uphold literally the
language of the Constitution and federal laws, then the Senate only
need ensure that a judicial candidate is willing and able to construe
those legal documents. After all, the Constitution and laws of the
United States, not judges, will dictate the outcome of cases. In fact,
Congress, which makes law, should have more influence over the
outcome of lawsuits than judges. If, however, as Judge Bork fears,
judges read their own political views into the Constitution and laws,
then the Senate must carefully consider who those judges are and
what views they espouse. With political judges, personal predilections rule instead of the Constitution and laws. Congress has reason
to worry when judges will not obey legislative instructions.
Thus, the bitter opposition to Judge Bork betrayed too much.
Judge Bork's opponents conceded that the type ofjudges they favor
do make policy. Nonetheless, Judge Bork unequivocally committed
to follow the laws as written by Congress. But Judge Bork's opponents did not want a judge who would religiously follow the words
of the Constitution and federal laws-instead, they preferred a
judge who would follow his own heart. Moreover, they hoped that
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the judge's heart would beat to the rhythm of their own political
drums. In legal matters, Judge Bork neither followed his heart nor
strove to synchronize his political preferences to those of a majority
of the Senate. Thus he lost.
YetJudge Bork's defeat proved his point. He lost in the Senate
because he had become a symbol. He stood for the traditional, now
questioned, concept that law is more important than the political
leanings of judges. Judge Bork's loss showed that political forces
indeed threaten to supplant the rule of law.
With further irony, Judge Bork's opponents claimed victory
over original meaning jurisprudence at the very moment its banner
began to triumph. President Reagan soon nominated Judge
Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court seat intended for Judge
Bork. With the addition of Justice Kennedy, the majority of the
Supreme Court appeared ready to follow the language of the law,
rather than policy considerations. Moreover, Judge Bork has not
quietly withdrawn from this intellectual battle. To the contrary, in
The Tempting ofAmerica: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law,' Judge Bork
again charges the entrenched forces who would subvert the law to
political uses. This charge promises to putJudge Bork's opponents
on the defensive.
As his work The Antitrust Paradox2 redefined antitrust law, so
does The Tempting promise to draw new battlelines in the conflict
over constitutional law. The Tempting shows that legal institutions,
particularly the Supreme Court, unfortunately have used the law as
a political tool to pursue particular policy goals. The Tempting also
shows that politicization of law endangers freedoms. The book
compellingly argues that original meaning jurisprudence is the only
workable theory of constitutional interpretation for a democratic society. Most important, Judge Bork's call for a return to the original
meaning of the Constitution stems not from a conservative political
agenda but from the Constitution itself.
I
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA-THEME AND STRUCTURE

The Tempting features three sections, each of which illustrates
the politicization of law within a different legal institution. Part I
documents the politicization of constitutional law by the Supreme
Court. Specifically, The Tempting traces the development of substantive due process, an open-ended doctrine that the Court fashioned
I

ROBERT H. BORE, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAw (1990) (referred to in text as The Tempting).
2

(1978).

ROBERT H.

BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX:

A Poucy AT WAR WrrH ITSELF
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to reach desired political results. Part II details the politicization of
law among legal academics. The Tempting describes in exhaustive detail an array of conservative and liberal scholarship that advocates
departure from the text of the Constitution. Despite lofty and appealing expression, these theories undercut self-government and
reverence for the law. Finally, Part III offers a thorough account of
Judge Bork's confirmation battle. This section illustrates how the
Senate distorts the judicial selection process to ensure that the law
generates particular political results.
While these sections seem disparate, they actually present a
unified theme. The lure of short-term political gains tempts American legal institutions to abandon the sometimes tedious processes of
the law. Yielding to the temptation may produce some immediate
pleasure, but it does so at the expense of generations of pain. Thus,
3
political law "contains the seeds of its own destruction."
The Tempting, therefore, calls for a return to "[t]he orthodoxy of
original understanding, and the political neutrality ofjudging it requires." 4 This approach to constitutional adjudication confines the
federal judiciary to its "intended function," which is "to apply the
law as it comes to [it] from the hands of others." 5 In so doing, the
jurisprudence of original meaning preserves the legal protections
6
for individual freedom.
II
POLrrICIZATION OF LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT

A.

Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection

According to Judge Bork, a passion for quick political results
tempts judges to abandon the processes and language of the law.
This passion sets several seductive snares. The Tempting starts with a
classic example. With mid-nineteenth-century America racked by
disagreement over slavery, the Supreme Court sought a quick political solution. At the time, a majority of the Court favored the Southem States. Not surprisingly, the Court departed from the language
of the Constitution to create a right to hold slaves.
Dred Scott v. Sandford was the Court's first venture into the uncharted wilderness of substantive due process. 7 Since that infamous
case, the Court often has employed the doctrine of substantive due
process to achieve short-term political gains. The Supreme Court
also used substantive due process to overturn health and safety reg3
4

R. BORK, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at7.

5
6

Id. at6.
Id.

7

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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ulations8 and to create a generalized right to privacy. 9
The Supreme Court of the early twentieth century even used
substantive due process to create "an entire new set of freedoms,
including a liberty to enter into contracts the legislature had prohibited, then refused to say what contracts were protected, but promised to go from case to case deciding in each whether the legislature
or the Court would govern."' 10 Some may believe that Supreme
Court activism always generates liberal doctrines, but the early
twentieth century aptly illustrates that the Court also can stray from
the Constitution to reach so-called "conservative" results. In short,
the decisions from this era often protected business property at the
expense of a state's health and safety concerns.
In search of other politically attractive results, more recent
Courts similarly have created rights of privacy not found in the Constitution. Again, thorny political problems have seduced the Court
into seeking predetermined results. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 1 for
example, members of the Court, abhorring a state's regulation of
contraceptives, sought to solve a societal problem. The Court did
so by creating a right of privacy that covered the decision of married
couples to use contraceptives. The noncontroversial political result
in Griswold, however, led to extremely controversial results in cases
dealing with abortion and homosexual activity.' 2 Moreover, the
Court has yet to explain the limits of privacy rights. Judge Bork
laments:
The Court majority said there was now a right of privacy but
did not even intimate an answer to the question, "Privacy to do
what?" People often take addictive drugs in private, some men
physically abuse their wives and children in private, executives
conspire to fix prices in private, Mafiosi confer with their button
men in private .... Moreover .... the Court has extended the
right of privacy to activities that can in no sense be said to be done
in private. The truth is that "privacy" will turn out to protect
those activities that enough Justices to form a majority think
ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little
3
sympathy.'
8 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor law invalidated);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hours law invalidated); see also Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (law setting minimum wage for female
workers invalidated).
9 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10 R. BoRx, supra note 1, at 44.
11 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); abortion cases cited infra note
22.
13 R. BORIC, supra note 1, at 99.
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Again the Court succumbed to the temptation of departing from the
Constitution to resolve political issues.
The doctrine of substantive equal protection similarly
politicizes constitutional interpretation. Congress and the states
created the equal protection clause primarily to protect the newly
freed slaves from oppression. When judges exceed this original
purpose, they inject their own moral or political preferences into the
Constitution. Judge Bork observes:
When ajudge assumes the power to decide which distinctions
made in a statute are legitimate and which are not, he assumes the
power to disapprove of any and all legislation, because all legislation makes distinctions ....
The case for confining the [fourteenth] amendment to statutory distinctions drawn in terms of
race or ethnicity is that permitting the judges to choose subjectively which grounds of classification they will treat like race confers upon the courts a power to tell legislatures how all of their
14
statutes on every subject must be written.
According to The Tempting, the Court has abused the equal protec15
tion clause to address transient political ills like poll taxes.
B.

The Demise of Federalism and the Separation of Powers

In the quest for desirable results, the Court also has ignored
constitutional provisions against centralization of local decisions.
The Constitution envisions clear divisions between national and local authority. Injudge Bork's eyes, the Court has blurred these distinctions. The Court has a parochial interest in elevating local
decisions to the national level, as it is the final arbiter of national
affairs. In other words, the Court advances its own importance by
nationalizing social issues.
The Tempting documents that the demise of federalism established an expanding role for the Court. Judge Bork faults the
Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn,16 which sustained the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, for subjecting "the
most trivial and local [farming] activities"' 17 to national judicial regulation. The Court "refus[ed] to enforce limits of any kind" on Congress's power to create national policy, despite the enumerated
powers of article I of the Constitution.' 8 The Court's action
"worked a revolution in the relationship of the federal government
to the state governments and to the people, and the revolution did
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 90-91.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 56.
Id. at 57.
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not have to await a constitutional amendment."' 9
As the divisions of power within the Constitution evaporate, the
Court's role in the policy arena expands. Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has rendered sweeping decisions on some
of society's most controversial political issues, 20 including school
desegregation, 2 1 abortion, 2 2 the death penalty, 23 and welfare administration. 2 4 The Court similarly has mandated social change by ordering or scrutinizing the apportionment of election districts, 25
19
20

Id.

For a complete survey of the areas of pervasive judicial involvement, see Bradley

C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions ofJudicialActivism, 66 JUDicATutRE 236 (Dec.-Jan. 1983).

21
E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (upholding lower court
desegregation plan which reassigned 42,000 of the system's 96,000 students to new
school districts, relocated teaching staff, closed 33 schools. and reorganized the grade
structure of elementary schools), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (finding segregation in one part of school system creates presumption that disproportionate attendance in other parts of the system is not adventitious),
reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972) (city could not, after district court ordered implementation of a county-wide desegregation plan, exercise option under Virginia law to operate its own separate school
system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (upholding desegregation plan issued by district court principally on basis of attendance statistics, not finding continued discriminatory intent), reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating school board's
adoption of free choice plan).
22
E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (invalidating parental consent law), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating spousal consent law); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (creating right to abortion and
detailed trimester scheme for gauging permissible state regulation), reh'gdenied, 410 U.S.
959 (1973). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Missouri's regulations forbidding state participation in abortion services and requiring viability testing in certain cases do not violate due process clause).
23
E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (imposition of death penalty for
felony murder, where defendant himself did not cause or intend victim's death, violates
eighth amendment); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (imposition of death
penalty struck down because Georgia courts failed to adhere to sufficiently specific standards); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape is disproportionate punishment and therefore unconstitutional under eighth amendment); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (imposition of death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment under eighth amendment), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
24 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients have right to predeprivation hearing under procedural due process guarantee of Constitution); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirement for welfare eligibility violates
equal protection clause and constitutional right of interstate travel).
25 E.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (election of junior college trustees on any basis other than one person-one vote is unconstitutional); Kilgarlin
v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (legislative reapportionment plan resulting in population variances
from + 14.84% to -11.64% among districts could not survive strict scrutiny), reh'gdenied,
386 U.S. 999 (1967); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (apportionment which took into account additional factors as well as population failed to
base representation sufficiently on population); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (representation in state legislature must be based on population), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870
(1964).
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pervasively supervising the criminal justice system, 26 and overseeing
27
voter eligibility.
This discussion leads Judge Bork to another hallmark of political law: the rise in the power of the Court has coincided with a
decline in the power of federal and state governments to make autonomous decisions. With time, the Court has deferred less and less
to federal and state legislatures. From 1803 through 1896, the
Supreme Court nullified only 19 federal statutes and 167 state
laws. 28 In the 27 years from 1897 through 1924, however, the
Court nullified 28 federal statutes and 212 state laws. 2 9 In the 30
years between 1940 and 1970, the Court nullified approximately the
same number of federal statutes but invalidated state legislation 278
times. 30 Most notably, 1970 through 1980 represents the period
where the Supreme Court invalidated more federal and state legislation than in any other 10-year period. The Court struck down 18
federal statutes and 184 state laws, which is more than the Court
typically invalidated in past 30-year periods. 3 1 The Tempting accurately charts the swift growth of judicial, at the expense of legisla32
tive, power.
With each successive case, the Court shrinks the sphere of legislative decision making and expands the role of the judiciary:
We observe . . . the increasing importance of the one countermajoritarian institution in the American democracy.... What is
worrisome is that so many of the Court's increased number of
declarations of unconstitutionality are not even plausibly related
to the actual Constitution. This means that we are increasingly
26 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (regulating voir dire in federal trials to effect selection of unbiased jury); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980) (incriminating post-indictment statement excluded when made in absence of
counsel by incarcerated defendant to fellow prisoner who acted as paid informant for
the Government); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (regulating parole procedures to guarantee fairness); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Court fashioned and
imposed detailed set of procedures governing police interrogation), reh'g denied, 385
U.S. 890 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (fourteenth amendment compels state
courts to enforce exclusionary rule), reh 'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
27 E.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (invalidating election code provision
prohibiting person from voting in primary elections of different parties within 23-month
period); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year state residency invalidated as
a prerequisite to voting privileges); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970)
(state cannot exclude nonproperty owners from voting in municipal bond elections);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax invalidated as
prerequisite to voting).
28 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONsTrrITION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1883-2092 (1987) (listing federal and state acts held unconstitutional).

29
30
31
32

See id.
See id.
See id.
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 130.
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governed not by law or elected representatives but by an
unelected, unrepresentative, unaccountable committee of lawyers
33
applying no will but their own.
C.

The Supreme Court's Use of Expansive Theories in its
Decisions

The Court's assumption of a political role also manifests itself
in the systematic failure to choose the most narrow grounds as the
basis for decisions. By using expansive theories to decide cases, the
Court reserves for itself a future role in shaping the direction of
social and political issues. Judge Bork accurately illustrated this
practice in his discussion of voter malapportionment cases.
According to Judge Bork, the Court adopted an expansive basis
for decision in Baker v. Carr3 4 and Reynolds v. Sims,3 5 the seminal
voter reapportionment cases. Again the Court sought a speedy path
out of a thorny political thicket. The Supreme Court interpreted the
equal protection clause to require reapportionment of state legislatures according to population, so as to endow each citizen's vote
with equal weight. Thus, these decisions not only required reapportionment but also prescribed the particular method that states must
use in restructuring their state governments. In other words, the
Court chose one theory ofpolitical representation over another
without any guidance from the Constitution.
The Tempting observes that the Court could have found for the
plaintiffs in Baker and Reynolds without establishing such a pervasive
judicial role. The Court could have relied on the Republican guarantee clause of article IV to order the state governments to conduct
redistricting as required by their state constitutions.3 6 Such a decision "would have resulted in an order that a majority of the state's
voters be permitted to reapportion their legislature," but "would
not tell.., voters what system of representation they were required
to 'choose.'
The Court by choosing the route it did instead maximized federal judicial control of reapportionment, despite a shakier
constitutional basis for doing so.
"-37

In the face of political need, the Court often has abandoned the
Constitution for a political solution. The long-term results, however, have always undercut rights to democratic choice. The Court
has, in Judge Bork's words, "cut through procedure to substance,
33

Id.

34
35

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 86.

36
37
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and through substance to political outcome."3 8
III
POLrrIcIZATION AND THE LEGAL SOPHISTS

The Supreme Court, though a primary architect, has no monopoly on the politicization of constitutional law. Both liberal and
conservative legal academicians continuously strive to revise the
premises of constitutional law. These revisionists have constructed
theories of judicial review that merely cloak politically oriented
judging in high-sounding theories about moral philosophy. Judge
Bork approaches these scholars as he approaches the law-without a
political agenda. The Tempting equally faults revisionists of the political right and left. Judge Bork explains:
[The modem political theorists'] concepts are abstruse, their
sources philosophical, their arguments convoluted, and their
prose necessarily complex. These writers are in fact undertaking
what Justice Story forswore, the alteration of the Constitution by
"ingenious subtleties," "metaphysical refinements," and "visionary speculation" to make it not a document "addressed to the
common sense of the people" but one addressed
to a specialized
39
and sophisticated clerisy ofjudicial power.
The Tempting blames these modem theories for giving the Court license to exceed legal and constitutional limits. Professor Thomas
Grey of Stanford Law School, for example, counsels judges to follow natural law. 40 The judge, of course, decides what law is natural.
Professor Ely's representational model of constitutional interpretation similarly places the judiciary in the business of making
political judgments. 4 1 According to Ely, judges must protect minority participation in the political decision-making process. In Judge
Bork's view, however, Ely's theory injects judges into the policymaking process:
Ely's theory, which purports to take judges out of the business of
making policy decisions, in fact plunges them into such decisions
by requiring that they distinguish between cases in which groups
lost in the legislative process for good reason (burglars) and those
in which they lost for discreditable reasons (aliens, the poor,
homosexuals, etc.).42
38
39
40

Id. at 132.
Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted).
See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703

(1975).
41 See John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of Judicial Review, 37
MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
42 R. BORK, supra note 1, at 199.

BOOK REVIEW-POLITICAL LA W

1990]

1347

Unlike Ely, Michael Perry of Northwestern University and the
former Justice Brennan make little effort to tie their theories of interpretation to the text or structure of the Constitution. According
43
to Perry, the Constitution represents fundamental aspirations.
Judges should divine this unwritten aspirational content when deciding cases. Similarly, Justice Brennan tied the text of the Constitution to notions of human dignity. 4 The Tempting responds that
this theory does not apply "old principles to new circumstances but
• . . chang[es] the principles themselves." 4 5 Judge Bork exposes
these theories as attempts to allow judges to apply the Constitution
"in accordance with their own philosophies." 4 6 Neither theory
identifies the source or the parameters of the "judge's authority to
'47
invalidate legislative acts."
The Tempting's next victim is Harvard professor Laurence Tribe:

[Tribe] insists upon "the non-existence of any satisfactory form of
representation," which "puts the burden of persuasion on those
who assert that legislatures (or executives) deserve judicial deference as good aggregators of individual preference." This certainly gets rid of the counter-majoritarian difficulty with judicial
supremacy, but it does so only by denying48 that democracy has any
claims that judges are bound to respect.
Thus, Tribe's theory of interpretation is antithetical to a democratic
government.
Judge Bork is evenhanded in his critique of constitutional theory. He also attacks conservative constitutional revisionism. For example, he calls Professor Bernard Siegan's analysis of economic
liberty "a comprehensive version of substantive due process," 4 9
while Professor Siegan's proposedjudicial tasks are "beyond the capacities of courts." 50 Siegan's theory necessarily requires thejudici43
See MichaelJ. Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278 (1981); MichaelJ. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression,
and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST.LJ. 261 (1981).
44

See THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WarrrEN

CONsTrrrrbON 11 (1986).
45

R. BoRx, supra note 1, at 219-20.

46

Id. at

220.

Id at 217 (emphasis in original). Michael Perry, for example, emphasizes the
human rights component of noninterpretive case law. See articles cited supra note 43.
He contends that human rights decisions only can be explained as products of noninterpretive review. This concern for the Court's attention to human rights sheds light on
what Perry believes to be the unique and critical government function advanced by
noninterpretive review but not original understanding.
48 R. BORK, supra note 1, at 201 (citations omitted).
49 Id at 225.
50 Id. at 226.
47
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ary to act in "a purely legislative manner."5 1 Judge Bork also
attacks Justice John Marshall Harlan's due process analysis, despite
the conservative appeal of his commitment to tradition.5 2 Justice
Harlan's theory suffers from ambiguity. The Harlan theory permits
judges to interpret the Constitution based on their own notions of
what constitutes tradition. What tradition should the courts invoke?
How widespread and established must something be to constitute
53
tradition? Must the tradition be endorsed by a majority?
In sum, Bork truly is consistent in his evaluation of modern theories of constitutional law. He exposes the flaws of any theory,
whether it yields conservative or liberal political results:
If the performance of the Court changes, it is to be hoped
that liberal revisionism will not be replaced by conservative revisionism. The two are equally illegitimate. The Constitution is too
and to our liberties to be
important to our national well-being
54
made into a political weapon.
IV
POLMCIZATION AND CONGRESS

Congress also has failed to act with intellectual integrity. The
Senate often blatantly supports or opposes judicial nominees depending on whether the nominee's views might advance the political
agenda of a majority of the body.
In Part III of his book, Judge Bork shows how his confirmation
process was a battle to memorialize a political agenda on the
Supreme Court:
[I]n the final analysis, the furor and the venom were less about me
than about the issue of whether the Court would become dominated by the neutral philosophy of original understanding and
thus decisively end its long enlistment on one side of the war in
our culture. 55
51 Id. at 229. Justice Holmes similarly chastised the majority in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905):
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State
or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or
novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution
of the United States.
52 See, e.g.,Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 501-02 (1965).
53 R. BORK, supra note 1, at 235 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT
60 (1980)).
54 Id. at 131.
55

Id. at 343.
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Consequently, the Senate overtly considered for the first time how a
nominee's views would affect the outcome of future Supreme Court
cases.
The Senate proceedings focused on political results. Many senators probed to discover how a "Justice Bork" would vote on the
Court. For example, during private meetings with Judge Bork,
many senators indicated that their vote hinged on how he dealt with
such issues as abortion. 56 The hearings also featured extensive outcome-specific inquiries. 57 Judge Bork concludes:
Whatever the "advice and consent" function of the Senate may
legitimately encompass, prudence suggests that it not consist of
an attempt to argue the outcome of specific issues. 58
56

IdL at 281.

See id. at 301. The Senate Report issued after the hearings reflects the overall
political tone of the proceedings. S. ExEc. REP. No. 100-7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) [hereinafter S. ExEc. REP.]. Specifically, most objections relate not to Judge
Bork's competence or integrity, but to concern that he would challenge existing liberal
decisions. The report warns: "Judge Bork has applied his theory of the Constitution to
attack a large number of Supreme Court decisions, including many landmark cases. Reconsidering these cases would reopen debate on many significant issues." Id at 21. Yet,
it is unclear why such continued judicial debate over constitutional issues is somehow
taboo. Such debate is exactly how the Court reached its decision in Brown. Without
renewed debate, "separate but equal" would have remained a lasting blot on the American constitutional landscape.
The report similarly expresses a fear thatJudge Bork would threaten the existence
and gradual expansion of the floating concept of privacy: "Judge Bork's failure to acknowledge 'the right to be let alone' illuminates his entire judicial philosophy. If implemented on the Supreme Court, that philosophy would place at risk the salutory
developments that have already occurred under the aegis of that right and would truncate its further elaboration." Id at 36. Note, however, that this discussion does not
criticize Judge Bork for infidelity to the Constitution, but for failing to recognize
"salutory developments" and for refusing to engage in "further elaboration."
Throughout the proceedings, the Senate Judiciary Committee engaged in an exhaustive analysis of Judge Bork's judicial views, often demanding answers that pose a
threat to judicial independence. Members of the committee explicitly asked Judge Bork
for his views on: the meaning of the ninth amendment, the standard to be used in sex
discrimination cases, the appropriate standard under the eighth amendment, the appropriate standards for protecting speech, the constitutionality of special prosecutors, congressional standing to sue, the extent of the President's removal power, the application
of the fourteenth amendment to ethnic discrimination, and the line between permissible
57

and impermissible intrusions by states on sexual freedom. See Hearingson the Nomination
of Robert H. Bork to be AssociateJusticeof the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate
Committee on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-25, 224, 231, 242, 254-57, 319-20,

338, 415 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings]. In one particularly notable episode, Senator
Leahy asked Judge Bork: "Would you agree or disagree with this proposition: that the
cases establishing a constitutional right to privacy in these matters have become part of
our law, and that whatever theoretical challenges may be available to them, it is too late
for the Supreme Court to tear them up?" Hearings,supra, at 752.
58
R. BORE, supra note 1, at 301. Bork's point is that a pervasive role by the Senate
in the confirmation process threatens the independence of the judiciary. Senator Roth
explained:
I am very troubled that the questioning of the nominee was too specific and too detailed. In effect, committee members were extracting
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Throughout a trying process, Judge Bork maintained his integrity and refused to make any "campaign promises" to the Senate
Committee. I have a favorite anecdote illustrating his devotion to
principle. As the hearings wore on, some advisers pled with Judge
Bork to tailor his legal message to suit a political audience. These
advisers counseled emotional speeches in favor of individual rights
and a few moving and memorable lines for nightly newscasts. These
sirens did not seduce Judge Bork. He responded kindly but firmly:
"I am a judge, not a politician." In short, Judge Bork would not
campaign for office. As perhaps the ablest legal mind of our generation, he qualified for appointment. The turbulent publicity, promotion, and puffery did not disrupt his compass.
Unfortunately, the Bork confirmation not only focused on the
likely voting pattern of a "Justice Bork" but did so in a distorted,
incorrect fashion. The proceedings and publicity distorted Judge
Bork's public record regarding the civil rights of racial minorities
and women, 59 the treatment of big business vis-fi-vis labor and consumers, 60 and the protection of free speech. 6 1 The entire Nation
campaign promises from the nominee who gave them under oath. In doing this the Senate is seeking to control the result of Supreme Court deliberations. In my opinion, this compromises the independence of the
judiciary and infringes on the separation of powers.
133 CONG. REC. S14,779 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987).
59 R. Bopix, supra note 1, at 326-31. The Minority Views section in the Senate Report accurately summarizes Judge Bork's civil rights record:
Judge Bork has an excellent record in civil rights cases, he has consistently and forcefully defended the civil rights of the parties appearing
before him. As a judge, he has ruled for the minority or female plaintiff
in seven of eight cases involving substantive civil rights issues. This includes cases such as Emoy v. Secretary of the Navy, 819 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir.
1987), whereJudge Bork reversed a district court's decision dismissing a
claim of racial discrimination against the United States Navy. His record
includes Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert [.]
denied, 469 U.S. 1181 (1985), where Judge Bork affirmed a lower court
decision which found that Northwest Airlines had discriminated against
its women employees. It includes Palmerv. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.
1987), where Judge Bork held in favor of women foreign service officers
alleging discrimination by the State Department in assignment and promotion. It includes Ososky v. Wick, 704 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where
Judge Bork voted to reverse the district court and hold that the Equal Pay
Act applies to the Foreign Service's merit system. It also includes County
Council of Sumter County, South Carolinav. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694
(D.D.C. 1983), 696 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1984) (per curiam), where he
held that the local county had failed to prove that its new voting system
had "neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the right of
black South Carolinians to vote." These decisions held (among other important rulings) that inferences of intentional discrimination can be made
based solely on statistical evidence, that Title VII's statutory limitations
should be liberally construed, and that female stewardesses may not be
paid less than male pursers in the job that are only nominally different.
S. EXEC. REP., supra note 57, at 224-25.
60 R. Botx, supra note 1, at 331-33.

1990]

BOOK REVIEW-POLITICAL LA W

1351

should lament that the Senate did not decide Judge Bork's fate on
the merits but on brute political realities. Again, this vindicates
62
Judge Bork's warning.
Judge Bork's fate highlights the frailties and dangers of political, rather than legal, decisions concerning judicial nominees.
Within weeks of'Judge Bork's defeat, the Senate overwhelmingly approved Judge Anthony Kennedy to serve on the Supreme Court as it
had overwhelmingly approved Judge Scalia before. Judge Scalia
and Judge Bork had practically identical records on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Supreme Court
scholars have detected few instances in which Justice Kennedy has
departed from the votes a "Justice Bork" would have been likely to
cast. Yet Judge Bork, and not the others, suffered political defeat.
This illustrates the unpredictability, arbitrariness, and transience of
political decisions.
If law as a whole slips into the political arena, the results could
threaten order and liberty. If court decisions reflect only the political whims of judges, eventually Americans will lose all confidence
that the Constitution and laws compel certain judicial results. If law
is solely politics in another cloak, Americans may have less reason to
feel that the judiciary's pronouncements have any greater moral
force or lasting quality than a temporary policy judgment. At some
point, respect for the law will wane. This waning, in turn, will engender a lack of respect for the freedom and safety of others.
61 Id at 333-36. The Minority Views section in the Senate Report similarly documents Judge Bork's record:
Judge Bork has a record as a strong advocate of the right to free
speech. Judge Bork has written such important opinions as Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), Lebron v. Washington Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984), F.T.C. v. Brown &
Williamson, 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and Reuber v. United States, 750
F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In OllmanJudgeBork relied on the changing
realities of libel litigation to conclude that it was necessary to have
greater first amendment protections for the press in that context. In
Lebron, Judge Bork held that an administrative agency had violated an artist's rights by refusing to let him display a poster extremely critical of
President Reagan in space leased for advertisements on the inside of subways. In Brown & WilliasonJudgeBork demonstrated his concern about
any form of censorship and vacated an injunction restricting a cigarette
company's ability to engage in certain kinds of advertising without prior
FTC approval, and remanded to the district court to enter a less restrictive injunction. And in ReuberJudge Bork sought to protect an employee
of a private firm who had spoken critically of the government, arguing
that an employee ought to be able to sue his employer if the employer
was an agent of the government.
S. ExEc. REP., supra note 57, at 224.

62 See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 336. For a discussion of the numerous falsehoods
contained in advertising againstJudge Bork, see 133 CONG. REC. S14,659-97 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1987).
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V
ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE

The Tempting presents the most compelling defense of original
meaning jurisprudence written in the modern era. The Constitution
itself, contends Bork, compels judicial reliance on the law as written.
Original meaning jurisprudence derives its force directly from
the language of the Constitution. The supremacy clause of article
VI makes "[t]his Constitution . . . the supreme Law of the Land
....*"63 The language of this provision announces that the Consti-

tution is "Law." As law, the Constitution as written binds judges as
well as legislators and other government officers. Moreover, the
Framers reduced their agreements to writing for a reason-to en64
sure that the terms of that writing have a fixed meaning over time.
Original meaning jurisprudence also preserves the bedrock
American principle of self-government. The Constitution defines in
writing the bounds of the majority's authority to govern. Beyond
those limits, the majority may not trample minority rights. Short of
those limits, society may freely set policy to benefit its members.
The Constitution wisely defines those bounds to prevent either the
majority or a minority from abridging the vital rights of others.
The Constitution charges the courts with the duty of policing
those bounds. In performing this duty, however, the courts must
neutrally apply the principles in the Constitution itself. Absent neutrality in the selection of principles, the Court could define the respective spheres of majority authority and individual liberty "as it
sees fit," 65 manipulating the breadth of principles to "make things
come out the way it wishes on grounds that are not contained in the
principle it purports to apply." 6 6 By maintaining the Court's neutrality in the use of constitutionally determined principles, original
understanding prevents life-tenured, unelected judges from choosing among principles to reach favored political outcomes.
Judge Bork makes a significant contribution to the original
meaning debate. He shows that original understanding supplies
"neutrality . . . in deriving, defining, and applying principle. '6 7
Original meaning eliminates the problem of neutral derivation of
principle because "Itihe judge accepts the ratifiers' definition of the
appropriate ranges of majority and minority freedom." 68 The lan63
64
(1803),
65
66
67
68

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
reflects this rationale.
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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guage of the Constitution limits the judge's range of choices.
No other modem theory of constitutional interpretation
secures the judicial neutrality necessary for the preservation of selfgovernment. After exhaustive analysis and critique, Judge Bork
concludes that "every theory not based on the original understanding.., requires the judge to make a major moral decision."' 69 None
of these other theories shows how judges can have "legitimate authority to impose their moral philosophy upon a citizenry that disagrees."' 70 Their lack of legitimacy is their downfall.
Various theorists have attacked the tenets of original meaning
jurisprudence. Judge Bork parries each of these thrusts. Judge
Bork flatly rejects the proposition that we cannot know the original
understanding of 100 or 200 years ago. Revisionists misrepresent
the focus of original understanding by asserting that we cannot
know the Founders' views as to particular contemporary questions.
This formulation, however, misstates the judicial task. The judge
need not discern the Framers' subjective intent but rather the meaning of the written word. Moreover, "the text, structure, and history
of the Constitution provide [the judge] not with a conclusion but
with a major premise." 7 1 The judge must apply that premise [o the
problems of our time. Thus, a judge may apply the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches to wiretaps without speculating
72
about the Framers' hypothetical views of electronic surveillance.
Judge Bork similarly refutes the revisionists' argument that
original understanding, like any other theory, requires the judge to
make political choices. Although the use of original jurisprudence
will result in the application of certain political decisions, "the political content of that choice is not made by the judge; it was made
73
long ago by those who desigried and enacted the Constitution.
Judge Bork further addresses the claim that the Constitution is
a document which must adapt to changes in society. He shows that
original understanding permits the Constitution to adapt to situations not present at the time of its founding. Judges may apply existing values to new circumstances but may not create new values. 74
Thus, "[ilt is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how
the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know."' 75 Moreover, the Constitution itself
accommodates societal change in numerous ways. Article V permits
69
70

71
72
73
74
75

Id at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 162.
See idtat 169.
Id at 177.
See id at 170.
Id at 167-68.
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each generation to incorporate new social values directly into our
basic charter. 76 Article I permits Congress to change laws to meet
77
changing needs.
Ours is a living Constitution. It lives because the genius of its
enduring principles continues to apply today as our fundamental
law. Those who reject the Constitution as written treat it as dead.
For them, enlightened judges must set aside the dusty language of
by-gone generations. These skeptics forget that the living Constitution has protected American liberties for more than two centuries.
VI
BORK AS MAINSTREAM CONsTIuT'ioNAUST

Constitutional revisionists branded Judge Bork as out of the
mainstream of reasonable legal discourse. The heyday of this invective was the 1987 confirmation process. These hearings characterized Judge Bork as an "extremist ...who will.., advance a far right
radical judicial agenda." 7 8 This commentary, however, demonstrates more aboutJudge Bork's opponents' position on the scale of
legal reasonability than anything about Judge Bork's views.
The honorable author of The Tempting has not invented a new
doctrine. Rather, he merely has revived an authoritative, but recently unpopular, doctrine. Judge Bork is not the first to attack
vague modes of constitutional interpretation, unfixed principles,
and boundless judicial discretion as threats to American self-government. Nor is he the first to suggest that the state can regulate
moral behavior. Indeed, Judge Bork's concerns mirror the views of
many of this Nation's preeminent legal scholars.
A thoughtful examiner must look back to the founding of the
Republic to find the origins of Judge Bork's concerns about the
preservation of self-government. In The FederalistNo. 78, Alexander
Hamilton remarked that "though individual oppression may now
and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of
the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so
long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature
and the Executive."' 79 Judge Bork similarly echoes the immortal
counsel of Chief Justice John Marshall, who stated in Marbury v.
Madison that "the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the
legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath
76
77
78
79

U.S. CONST. art. V.
U.S. CONST. art. I.
Hearings, supra note 57, at 78.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 227 (Roy P. Fairfield ed. 1966).
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to support it?"80

In fact, whenever the Court has departed from the Constitution
to make political choices, an array of respected justices have
sounded alarms. Among the ardent foes of political law are Justices
Holmes, Frankfurter, and Black. In Truax v. Corrigan,8 ' for example,
Justice Holmes dissented:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words
to prevent the making of social experiments that an important
part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded
by the several States, even though the experiments may seem fu82
tile or even noxious to me.

Like Justice Holmes, Justice Frankfurter frequently warned the
Court that an expansive judicial role threatens American self-government. In Dennis v. United States,8 3 where the Court upheld the
conviction of Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act, Justice
Frankfurter concurred separately:
[lihe Framers of the Constitution chose to keep the judiciary dissociated from direct participation in the legislative process....
[T]he extent to which the exercise of this power [of judicial review] would interpenetrate matters of policy could hardly have
been foreseen by the most prescient. The distinction which the
Founders drew between the Court's duty to pass on the power of
Congress and its complementary duty not to enter directly the domain of policy is fundamental.... Our duty to abstain from confounding policy with constitutionality demands perceptive
humility as well as self-restraint in not declaring unconstitutional
what in a judge's private judgment is deemed unwise and even
84
dangerous.
In the West Virginia flag salute case, Justice Frankfurter similarly described the proper role of a judge:
As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I
may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.
Judicial self-restraint is equally necessary whenever an exercise of political or legislative power is challenged. There is no
warrant in the constitutional basis of this Court's authority for attributing different roles to it depending upon the nature of the
80
81
82
83
84

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80 (emphasis in original).
257 U.S. 312 (1921).
Id at 344.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Id. at 552.

1356

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1338

challenge to the legislation. Our power does not vary according
to the particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked.8 5
Justice Frankfurter observed that the Court's invalidation of legislation under "the spirit of the Constitution" amounts to an "undefined destructive power . . . not conferred on this Court by the

Constitution." 8 6 The Tempting merely resurrects these once respected concerns.
Justice Black's remarks also frequently addressed the proper judicial role. In Ferguson v. Skrupa,s 7 he remarked for the majority:
The doctrine that prevailed in [several cases]-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been
discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
8
laws.8
Of course, Justice Black had not anticipated the later resurrection of
substantive due process.
Surely no sincere student of the Constitution would brand
these three Justices as extreme or accuse them of expressing a particular political agenda in their opinions. Yet Judge Bork has been
exiled from the mainstream of legal thought for identical views.
Bork contends that the revisionists' constitutional sophistry threatens the very institutions that preserve self-government. He warns
that "[a]s we move away from the historically rooted Constitution to
one created by abstract, universalistic styles of constitutional reasoning, we invite . . . disrespect for the actual institutions of the

American nation."8 9 As a consequence, "[t]he attempt to define individual liberties by abstract moral philosophy, though it is said to
broaden our liberties, is actually likely to make them more
vulnerable." 90
One of the most interesting aspects of The Tempting is that
Judge Bork occasionally steps back from doctrinal discussion of the
law to express his horror at the everyday ramifications of adopting
85 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647-48 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 666; see also concurring Justice Jackson's observation in

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 535 (1953):

Whatever has been intended, this Court also has generated an impression
in much of the judiciary that regard for precedents and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have always meant to the

profession, that the law knows no fixed principles.
87
88
89
90

372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Id. at 730.
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 352.
Id. at 353.
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today's revisionist philosophy. Judge Bork particularly ridicules the
suggestion that the state cannot regulate moral behavior. Judge
Bork asserts that "[m]oral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory legislation." 91
This principle draws support from nearly all judicial writers. In
Griswold, concurring Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan readily admitted that the Court's ruling "in no way interferes with a
92
State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."
Justice Brennan similarly observed in Eisenstadt that the state properly could regulate "the problems of extramarital and premarital
sexual relations . . ...93 Both Justices Douglas and Brennan even
left some room for the states to regulate pornography because of its
94
danger to juveniles and its offensiveness to unconsenting adults.
Surely no one would consider these Justices extreme for espousing
constitutional doctrine which recognizes a role for the state in regulating moral behavior.
In sum, then, The Tempting espouses a mainstream and historically prevalent theory of constitutional interpretation. The theory
finds its origins in the Constitution itself. Leadingjurists in this Nation's history have relied on the same theory to explain their decisions. Contrary to some of Judge Bork's critics, Judge Bork's
approach is neither radical nor a mask to hide a conservative political agenda.
CONCLUSION

Today's revisionist literature is not about interpretation but
about obtaining political power through the judiciary. The terms of
the revisionists' rhetoric cloak this purpose well, but one need only
scratch the surface of their arguments to see how a departure from
original meaning would threaten freedom and democracy.
Still, the lure of political results tempts judges to abandon the
written laws. Judge Bork shows that original meaning jurisprudence
can arrest this politicization of the law by resolving disputes with an
appeal to the text and context of the Constitution. Judges need not
consult their own personal morality or philosophy. Moreover, this
judicial process preserves individual rights, self-government, diversity, and self-determination. Judge Bork's loss in the Senate underscored his warnings against judges who prefer to follow their own
predilections. The Tempting adds an emphatic exclamation point.
91
92

Id at 124.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972).
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 112-14 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93
94

INTERPRETING BORK
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW.

By Robert H. Bork. I New York: The Free Press, 1989. Pp. 355.
Michaelj. Gerhardtt
INTRODUCTION

Robert Bork is back. And he is mad.
In a new book, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law, 2 Bork mounts a full-scale response to the Senate's rejection
of his nomination as an Associate Justice by the largest margin of
any Supreme Court nominee in American history. 3 His assault
makes clear, once and for all, that when it comes to constitutional
interpretation, Bork would not agree with Oscar Wilde's statement
that "the only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it. ' ' 4 For
Bork, the temptation in question is judges' reading their own personal values or policy preferences into the Constitution under the
guise of interpretation. To succumb to this temptation imposes, in
Bork's words, "heavy costs for the legal system, heavy costs for our
liberty to govern ourselves .... Then there is no law; there are only
the moral imperatives and self-righteousness of the hour." 5 Bork's
prescription for resisting this temptation is a rigid commitment to
the theory of original understanding. This theory requires judges to
confine themselves to discovering, and consequently respecting,
what each constitutional provision objectively meant to its framers
and ratifiers-leaving to the majoritarian legislative processes any
1 John M. Olin Scholar in Legal Studies, American Enterprise Institute; Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1982-88.
t Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, the College of William and Mary, 1990-91.
B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago.
I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Neal Devins, Dave Douglas, Dan Kobil, Tracey
Maclin, H. Jefferson Powell, Glenn Reynolds, Chris Schroeder, Gale Sigal, Rodney K.
Smith, and Ron Wright for their invaluable and generous comments on an earlier draft;
and John Dorsey and Katherine Lange for their exemplary research assistance.
2 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw (1989).
3 See 133 CONG. REC. S15,011 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987) (rejecting Bork's nomination 58-42); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Case of the Bork
Nomination, 5J.L. & POL. 551 (1989) (characterizing Bork's rejection as the largest of any
Supreme Court nominee in American history).
4 OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 18 (Isobel Murray ed. 1974).
5 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 132.
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matter on which the Constitution, or the original understanding of
its framers and ratifiers, is silent or ambiguous.
This Book Review Essay argues that Bork's theory of original
understanding cannot coherently and consistently overcome certain
problems endemic to the interpretation of the written constitutional
text, the search for objective historiography, and the reconsideration of precedents not based on original understanding. This Essay
suggests further that the inherent difficulties in Bork's crafting a
sensible and politically acceptable articulation of original understanding have led Bork in his confirmation hearings and in his book
to take contradictory positions on many issues.
Part I offers a brief synopsis of The Tempting ofAmerica and identifies the two objectives that pervade it. First, Bork provides his
most comprehensive defense yet of his theory of original understanding. Second, he provides for the first time in print his own
perspective on his confirmation proceedings. This Part suggests
that Bork has aligned himself against so much constitutional doctrine and theory that he can claim a place in the mainstream of constitutional commentary only by excluding almost everyone else from
it.
Part II identifies the limitations of Bork's theory of constitutional interpretation. This Part uses a variety of examples from
Bork's book to illustrate his problems with (1) finding the meaning
of the written constitutional text, (2) the search for original historiography, and (3) nonoriginalist precedents. These problems cumulatively demonstrate that Bork's theory lacks coherence and fails to
achieve its stated goal: to consistently restrain judicial tyranny.
Part III critiques Bork's condemnation of his confirmation proceedings. This Part suggests that the primary reason for the Senate's rejection of Bork's nomination is that Bork deconstructed
himself. As Bork's testimony exposed various contradictions buried
in his work, the Senate lost confidence in Bork's claim that his theory of constitutional interpretation would restrain the judiciary on a
basis more principled than any ever previously followed by the
Court. The Senate, faithful to its own constitutional duties, also
took note of the fact that when Bork faced the temptation of moderating his own views in order to secure a seat on the Supreme Court,
he quickly yielded.
I
THE WORLD ACCORDING TO BORK

The Tempting of America is vintage Bork-it is written in clipped
sentences, laced with biting humor, mercilessly blunt, and brimming
with self-confidence (if not self-righteousness). The book's most
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significant stylistic characteristic is its pervasive religious imagery.
For example, the title is a subtle reference to the temptations of
Adam and Samson; 6 and Bork refers to, inter alia, the "creation" of
the Constitution, 7 the "fall" of the American judiciary as the result
8
of the first taste of the irresistible "apple" ofjudicial activism, origi9
nal understanding as constitutional "orthodoxy," the "heresy" of
rejecting original understanding,10 and the Constitution as a "sacred text"1 " and a kind of "civil religion." 1 2 Bork's use of religious
imagery underscores his conviction in his theory of original understanding, but it also creates a tone more appropriate for a brief than
the dispassionate constitutional treatise this book purports to be.' 3
In the first part of the book, Bork relates the history of how the
Court came to see itself as the national conscience. Bork uses this
history to critique the Court's development of an extraordinarily
wide range of liberal constitutional doctrine. Bork denounces, for
example, the Court's decisions to uphold virtually all New Deal legislation.' 4 He also criticizes the Court's construction of the equal
6

7
8

See Genesis 3:1-:24;Judges 16:1-:30.
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 19.
Id.

Id. at 153, 216; see also id. at 6, 7.
Id. at 6, 7, 11. However, Bork later says that the liberals may have sacrificed him
as a "heretic" rather than as an "infidel." Id at 343.
9

10
11

Id. at 351.

Id. at 153. The book is also divided, like the Trinity, into three parts. The book's
parts are entitled "The Supreme Court and the Temptation of Politics," id. at 15, "The
Theorists," idt at 133, and "The Bloody Crossroads," id. at 267.
13
Out of concern that my tone in describing and/or critiquing Bork's book may
occasionally seem strident, I hasten at this juncture to emphasize that my reaction to
Bork's book may be similar to the late Arthur Leff's reaction to Richard Posner's law and
economics theory: "There is no doubt that the mind at work in this book is supple,
strong, and even (in a sense) sensitive .... [Admittedly,] I [do] have an ax to grind, and
more than enough fury to turn the wheel. But let no one be misled; it is the high intellectual quality of the book which enrages me, not its incompetence." Arthur A. Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 462 (1974).
14
See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 51-57. Although Bork critiques the rise of substantive due process in cases involving private economic interests, such as Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), he also critiques the demise of Lochner as an evisceration of
federalism. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 44-46, 57-58. Bork approves of the Court's abandonment of substantive due process protection for private economic interests. Yet he
believes that the cases that upheld components of the New Deal, including, for example,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), undermine federalism by expanding federal
governmental power at the expense of rightful state autonomy. R. BORK, supra note 2, at
58. In particular, he finds three faults with the decisions upholding the New Deal:
The first is that [they] throw[] the Court's considerable prestige behind a
political decision and endorse[] a line of economic argument, which...
happen[s] to be quite wrong .... The second is that the concept of substantive due process was kept alive because the Court purported to examine the conditions that made the so-called liberty of contract
inapplicable. Thus, an extraconstitutional idea was left to do damage in
the future. Third, the performance lent itself to disingenuousness in the
future. The Court purported to apply the constitutional doctrine of sub12
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 1 5 as requiring the
government to condition or distribute certain unenumerated fundamental interests on equal terms, 1 6 and as supporting special judicial
protection for groups other than blacks.1 7 Furthermore, he rejects
the Court's application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the
process of incorporation,1 8 reading of the fourteenth amendment
due process clause to protect any aspect of individual privacy (including abortion),1 9 and approval of "group entitlements" for
stantive due process to economic regulation, but in fact the Court abolished the doctrine, because from then on every such regulation of
economic activity was upheld.
Id. Bork believes that the distribution of power between the federal and state governments is the only "neutral" protection of individual liberty in the original Constitution.
This belief is the common thread running throughout his critique of the New Deal
Court. Id. at 53.
15
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
16
See R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 61-67. Bork critiques the Court's use of the equal
protection clause to provide substantive (or special) protection to fundamental interests
that the framers and ratifiers never considered as such. For example, he critiques the
Court's first such use of the clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that a state statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals violated a
fundamental right to procreate derived from the equal protection clause). Bork's comprehensive critique of the Court's equal protection doctrine includes his disagreement
with the Court's decision to strike down state poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). R. Bork, supra note 2, at 90-91.
17 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 58-61. Bork maintains that the Court, beginning in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), has flagrantly deviated
from the original understanding of equal protection as a guarantee of racial equality
only for the newly freed slaves and their descendants.
18
R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 93-95. To Bork, the process of making the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states through the due process clause "enormously expanded
the Court's power ... [and did] much to alter the moral tone of communities across the
country." It. at 94-95. What Bork neglects to mention is the historical evidence supporting the view that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to make the
first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the privileges or immunities clause. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 937-38 (1986). In its
decisions selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights through the due process clause,
beginning in 1897 and continuing through the Burger Court years, the Court relied on
this history as much as it did on expanding notions of the substantive content of the
liberty component of the due process clause.
19 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 95-100, 110-26. For Bork, the most illegitimate cases
are those recognizing any general constitutional right of privacy, including Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (197,2), Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'd denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977), and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989). These decisions are illegitimate because they ignore the fact that the framers
and ratifiers intended to protect only those aspects of privacy that had been expressly
delineated in the Bill of Rights. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 114. To go beyond the framers' designated areas of constitutional protection for privacy is, in Bork's mind, judicial
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blacks. 20 For Bork, the mistake unifying all of this as well as the rest
of the Court's liberal constitutional doctrine 2 l is its repeated failure
to remain faithful to the original understanding of the particular
constitutional provisions being interpreted. Consequently, the
Court has also failed to respect the majority's "liberty" to treat subjects on which the Constitution is silent or ambiguous. 2 2 It is true,
as Bork argues, that some scholars endorse his methodology23 and a
larger number critique some of the same decisions. 24 Even so, no
one else shares the size and range of Bork's cumulative critique of
25
over two centuries of constitutional decisionmaking.
In the second part of his book, Borkjustifies his theory and denounces liberal critiques of, and alternative theories to, original understanding. While the book's fulcrum is Bork's authority for strict
judicial fidelity to original understanding, Bork curiously waits until
almost the middle of the book to explain briefly (in only two pages)
that the bases for this theory are: (1) implications from the structure
of the Constitution; (2) some of the framers' selected comments
"fiat." Id. Such judicial "fiat" creates a "loose canon in the law." Id at 97. To Bork,
Roe v. Wade itself is "the greatest example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of
democratic prerogatives in this century." Id. at 116.
20
Id at 104. Bork critiques the Court's rewriting of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in such cases as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), andJohnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 101-07.
He approves of the Court's retreat on providing blacks any substantive position in society in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989). See R. BORK, supra
note 2, at 108-09. Bork's critique of "group entitlements" for blacks is also aimed at any
affirmative action programs designed to help blacks. Id. at 106-10. For example, Bork
praises the Court's recent decision in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706
(1989) as a "moderate ...and overdue... adjustment[] in civil rights doctrine." R.
BORK, supra note 2, at 107. Bork does not, however, take direct aim at any of the Court's
other affirmative action decisions, including, most notably, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
21
Bork also criticizes ChiefJustice Marshall's activism under the commerce clause
to expand congressional power, R. BORK, supra note 2, at 21-25; the Court's use of substantive due process to protect slave-holding, id. at 31; the rise in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries of substantive due process protecting private property rights
and a realm of privacy within which parents could make decisions about their children's
education, id. at 40-49; any judicial interference with states' powers to reapportion
themselves, id. at 84-87; the Court's upholding Congress's power to interpret, as opposed only to enforce, fourteenth amendment guarantees as defined by the Court, id at
92; and the Court's construction of the first amendment as protecting any verbal expression, other than purely political speech, not directed at overthrowing the government.
Id. at 126-28, 333-36.
22
Id. at 53, 139, 352-53.
23
Bork identifies only four contemporary constitutional scholars-Raoul Berger,
Michael McConnell, Lino Graglia, and joseph Grano-who share his "traditional position that the original understanding controls." Id. at 223-24.
24
Id. at 152, 324, 330, 332.
25
See Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in ConstitutionalLaw,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253, 260-61 (1986).

1990]

BOOK REVIEW-INTERPRETING BORK

1363

made at the constitutional convention and during the ratification
campaign; and (3) the need, in the absence of any historical justification for the theory, to create the theory in order to preserve the
Constitution itself.2 6 Bork insists that strict judicial fidelity to origi-

nal understanding is the most effective resolution of the "Madisonian dilemma," 27 which is his label for the problem created by
unprincipled judicial interference with legitimate majoritarian
decisionmaking.
After defending original understanding, Bork critiques constitutional theorists. He castigates liberal revisionists, 28 conservative
revisionists, 29 and the entire Rehnquist Court (called "left-liberal" 3 0 ) for recognizing or relying on values that cannot be recon31
ciled with original understanding.
In the third part of his book, Bork condemns his confirmation
proceedings. 3 2 Bork regards his defeat as having been masterminded by the liberal elite, which he describes as frustrated refugees from the 1960s who are urging the federal courts to adopt the
liberal policies they could never get legislatures to endorse. 3 3 Not
only does Bork believe that these people have infiltrated academia,
government, media, and public interest groups, but that they
targeted him specifically because of his lifelong commitment to exposing their intellectual dishonesty.3 4 Bork links his defeat to the
26

R. BORK,supra note 2, at 154-55.

Id at 139-40. Bork explains that the "central problem" facing judges trying to
interpret the Constitution is the "Madisonian dilemma," which involves the "never ending search for the correct balance" between two constitutional principles:
The first principle is self-government, which means that in wide areas of
life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are
majorities. The second is that there are nonetheless some things majorities must not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the individual
must be free of majority rule. The dilemma is that neither majorities nor
minorities can be trusted to define the proper spheres of democratic authority and individual liberty.
Id
28
For Bork, the principal liberal revisionists are Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely,
Laurence Tribe, and Justice William Brennan. See id. at 187-206, 219-21. Bork regards
the secondary liberal revisionists as Frank Michelman, Richard Parker, Duncan Kennedy
(and the Critical Legal Studies he leads), Paul Brest, Thomas Grey, David Richards,
Ronald Dworkin, Mark Tushnet, Bruce Ackerman, Michael Perry, Sanford Levinson, and
Leonard Levy. See id. at 206-19.
29 For Bork, the conservative revisionists-are Bernard Siegan, Richard Epstein, and
Justice John Marshall Harlan. See id. at 224-35.
30 Id at 126.
31
In particular, Bork criticizes all of the individual opinions in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, reh'g denied, 110 S.Ct. 22 (1989). See R. BORK,supra note 2, at 23540.
32 Bork describes his hearings as the "bloody crossroads where politics and law
meet." See id. at 269.
33 Id. at 338.
34 Id. at 9, 279, 338-39, 343.
27
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liberal elite's distortion of his record and to their intimidation of
liberal senators. 3 5 Yet, throughout this discussion, Bork never appreciates the irony that his stated commitment to majoritarian
power (even when it acts precipitously), as the central principle underlying the Constitution, belies his deep-seated resentment over
the failure of the majoritarian process to treat him fairly.
In his conclusion, Bork reemphasizes judicial fidelity to original
understanding as the most effective means for resolving the "Madisonian dilemma." He suggests that "self-government" is the most
important "liberty" that Americans possess 3 6 and predicts that
judges' disregard for this "liberty" will increase "disrespect for the
actual institutions of the American nation," decrease the ability of
the popularly elected branches to reach compromise and to dilute
absolutism on divisive political issues, and weaken "the freedoms
from government guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the post-Civil
War amendments." 37 Returning to the religious imagery he has
used throughout the book, Bork concludes that "[c]onstitutional
doctrine that rests upon a parochial and class-bound version of morality, one not shared by the general American public, is certain to
be resented and is unlikely to prove much of a safeguard when crisis
38
comes."

II
BoRK's

A.

ORIGINAL SINS

The Textual Problems

There are four problems with Bork's treatment of the text of
the Constitution. First, he assumes that one can discern a clear
meaning from the written constitutional text. 39 Second, he substitutes other historical texts in. place of the Constitution when he believes that these other texts more accurately reflect the original
understanding of the Constitution. 40 Third, Bork wrongly assumes
that original understanding provides a stable source of constitutional meaning.4 1 Fourth, Bork frequently avoids and/or distorts
tensions and contradictions in the Constitution. Sometimes he sees
contradictions where there are none; at other times, he ignores contradictions in the text that undermine his interpretive theory; and, at
still other times, he uses his interpretive theory to rewrite contradic35

Id. at 323-36.

36

Id. at 352.

37

Id. at 352-53.

38

Id. at 354.

39
40
41

See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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tions.42 In the following section, I take these criticisms in order.
1. Bork Assumes that the Written Constitution Has a Clear Meaning
Bork assumes that the written constitutional text has a clear
meaning in spite of considerable scholarship that emphasizes the
virtual impossibility of written texts (even political ones) to have
clear, indisputable meanings. 43 For example, such scholarship
posits that nothing in the nature of a text constrains a reader to
construe it solely in accordance with authorial meaning. 44 Bork responds to this criticism by arguing that if we do not choose the
authors' (or, in the setting of constitutional interpretation, the framers' and ratifiers') meaning, then we have no norm of interpretation
and we risk opening the Constitution to the floodgates of critical
anarchy. 4 5 Bork distinguishes the Constitution from other, nonlegal texts on the sensible basis that the people ratified the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.4 6 In order for the Constitution

to fulfill its unique purpose, Bork argues, we must choose only one
source-original understanding-for its meaning.
Acknowledging the Constitution as the supreme law of the land
does not in any way necessitate or require strict fidelity to original
understanding as the sole source of constitutional meaning. The
See infra notes 56-86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., PAUL DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING 246-77 (1979) (discussing Rousseau's writings); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 295-302 (Gayatri C. Spivak
trans. 1976) (discussing Rousseau's writings); ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE Two MARaXsMs
(1980) (discussing Marx's writings); Jacques Derrida, Declarations of Independence, NEw
POLITICAL SCIENCE 7 (Summer 1986). Recent work in literary theory emphasizes the
role that interpretive communities play in determining the authoritative meaning of
texts, and some of that work questions the basis from which an interpretive community
gains its authority. See CHRISTOPHER BUTLER, INTERPRETATION, DECONSTRUCTION, AND
IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME CURRENT ISSUES IN LrERARY THEORY (1984);
STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIEs (1980); THE PoITIcs OF INTERPRETATION (William Mitchell ed. 1983); see also
42

43

MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

60-69 (1988) (discussing the flaws with textualism in constitutional theory); Paul Brest,
Interpretationand Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-71 (1982) (offering a brief sociology
of the coercive creation of interpretive communities); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some
Realism about Idealism, 7 CARDozO L. REV. 693 (1986) (discussing some of the ambiguities
in Fish's work).
44
Interestingly, Bork's theory of constitutional interpretation parallels the theory
of literary interpretation of the American hermeneuticist E.D. Hirsch. See E.D. HIRSCH,
JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967) (arguing that authors put meanings into texts
and readers assign significance). Hirsch's theory has been criticized for three reasons.
First, it is premised upon the choice of an arbitrary anchor of meaning; second, it assumes authorial meanings are discoverable and immune to the passage of time; third, it
assumes further that authorial meanings do not require the same kind of interpretation
as the texts they purportedly explain. See FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRrICISM 257-80 (1980).
45 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 2, 155.
46 Id. at 172-76.
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supremacy clause 4 7 tells us that the Constitution-whatever the
meaning of its internal language and structure-has superior status
to other human laws. The clause does not say anything about (nor
express preference for) any particular methodologies of interpreting the Constitution. In other words, the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, but we must still decide how to construe
such a supreme legal document. Moreover, in spite of the Constitution's purpose, the document makes use of language, and, therefore, cannot elude the obscuring of meaning that any use of
language (even within a political context) entails. 48 Regardless of
any contrary intent of their creators, written texts are not transparent media through which meanings leap out to their readers. This is
even true of documents, such as the Constitution, that were the
product of compromise and consist of (quite often purposefully)
broad language. The nature of language is such that whenever
readers actively engage in the interpretation of a text, their construction depends on what those readers bring to the text as well as
on what they think they find in it. In short, the process of reading a
written text necessarily involves the reader's values.
2.

Bork Substitutes Other Historical Texts in Place of the
Constitution

Bork ignores the constitutional text in order to substitute in its
place other historical texts that he believes more accurately reflect
its original understanding. For example, Justice Black read the free
speech clause of the first amendment 4 9 as meaning that Congress
could pass "no law abridging freedom of speech," and he understood "speech" to consist of at least any verbal expression. 5 0 He
found support for his broad reading in the plain meaning of the
amendment's words and because no other amendment spoke in
such absolutely prohibitive terms. Surely this is not the only reading of the free speech clause, but it is a plausible one. Yet Bork
47
The supremacy clause provides that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
Land ..
" U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
48 Bork himself acknowledges this problem, R. BORK, supra note 2, at 147, but fails
to fully comprehend that political texts are written to reflect a "voice of union," even

though "the appearance of union may be deceptive." John Leubsdorf, Deconstructingthe
Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REV. 181, 182 (1987). See also supra note 44.
49 The first amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
50
See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (Black, J., dissenting), reh'g denied,
368 U.S. 869 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1959) (Black,J., concurring) reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950 (1960); see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 865, 874, 879 (1960).
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rushes past this reading to search for a consensus among the framers and ratifiers on what the clause really "means." Similarly, Bork
argues that the equal protection clause should be limited to claims
of racial minorities, 5 ' even though the text of that clause contains no
such limitation. Ironically, Bork fails to recognize that he has ignored the "sacred text" of these and other provisions of the Constitution in order to interpret them on the basis of other arguably
more revealing "texts."
Moreover, Bork's reliance on the framers' and ratifiers' objective understanding-as discovered in these other texts-as the sole
source of meaning of the constitutional text has no direct link to the
text itself. Original understanding is an arbitrary anchor of meaning
because it is no more authoritative, defensible, or sensible than any
number of other choices, including, for example, the understanding
of only the ratifiers whose votes actually counted in forming the
original number necessary for ratification, 5 2 the understanding of
past and contemporary constitutional scholars and historians, or the
Court's account of what the plain language means to it at any given
moment in time.
3. Bork Assumes that Original UnderstandingProvides a Stable
Source of ConstitutionalMeaning
Bork is mistaken in assuming that what he has substituted for
the text, original understanding, is a stable source of constitutional
meaning. Meanings are the products of language, which "always
has something slippery about it.' ' 53 Therefore, the meaning for
which Bork searches is not as stable, pure, or solid as he thinks.
Bork assumes that the constitutional text has an absolute, immutable meaning that is wholly resistant to historical change. To secure
the meaning of the Constitution for all time, rescuing it from the
ravages of history, Bork argues that interpretation must monitor its
potentially anarchic details by hemming them back with original understanding. Bork's stance toward the text is authoritarian and juridical-anything that cannot be herded inside the enclosure of
original meaning is brusquely expelled, and everything remaining
within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single gov54
erning intention.
See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 37, 328-29.
See Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudenceof OriginalIntent: The Recent
Past, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 255-82 (1989).
53 TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 69 (1983).
54 See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 2, at 329 (arguing that the broad language of the
equal protection clause, which applies by its own terms to any "person," must be restricted to the scope of its original understanding, which was, according to Bork, to
51
52

provide special protection only to racial minorities).
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Bork's belief in the existence of an objective understanding of a
textual provision as representing its sole meaning is, however, misplaced. It is impossible to make a complete or neat distinction between "what the text means," "what the text meant to the framers,"
"what the text meant to the ratifiers," and "what the text means to
Bork." Any such notion of absolute objectivity is an illusion. Bork
fails to realize that his reconstruction of the constitutional text's
meaning can only occur within his own historically conditioned
frame of meaning and perception at the expense of rejecting other
individuals' equally defensible readings.
Bork's quest for rules to guide constitutional interpretation not
only distances him from the text but also forces him to exchange the
interpretive problems with the text for interpretive problems stemming from his particular interpretive rule. 5 5 The original understanding for which Bork searches is itself a complex "text," which
can be debated and can give rise to various interpretations, just as
any other text (including the Constitution itself). Bork is on a hopeless quest not so much for the Constitution's meaning, but for
certainty.
4.

Bork Uses His Interpretive Theory to Rewrite the Contradictions
in the Constitution
a. Bork Ignores Certain Contradictions in the Text

Bork frequently fails to confront certain tensions and contradictions that permeate the Constitution; he uses his interpretive theory
to avoid them. This problem is common to the interpretation of all
written texts: readers tend to emphasize or seek out the values,
ideas, or themes in a particular text that reinforce their own particu56
lar agenda, and discount or even ignore conflicts in the text.
Readings of written texts (even by legal scholars) are necessarily selective, and to a significant degree depend on the choices of facts,
trends, meanings, and values that the reader imputes to the text.
For example, Bork takes inconsistent positions with respect to
whether Congress or the federal judiciary should protect federalism.
With respect to the commerce clause, 5 7 he first praises ChiefJustice
See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326, 1332-33 (1984).
56
See generally T. EAGLETON, supra note 53, at 9-16. It is particularly true that "a
Constitution written in general terms often requires value choices to determine its content." Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90
(1989); see also Charles P. Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court in a Modern World, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 427, 428 (1951); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1987).
57 The commerce clause provides that the Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55
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Marshall for recognizing plenary congressional power under it,58

and refers approvingly to his own arguments as Solicitor General in
National League of Cities v. Usery5 9 that Congress could regulate substantial state activity under it.60 Bork then switches gears, arguing
that the Court erroneously sacrificed rightful state authority under
the tenth amendment 6' in order to uphold New Deal legislation
under the commerce clause. 6 2 Bork also hints that the Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 6 3 which essentially adopted the position he urged in National League of Cities,
was wrongly decided because the Court did not adequately respect

the states' tenth amendment powers. 64 The problem is that either
the Congress has plenary authority under the commerce clause,
which would extend to regulating even the states, or Congress does
not; or the states have powers protected by the tenth amendment

that the federal courts may identify and apply to restrict Congress's
commerce powers, or the states do not. Bork, however, tries to have
it both ways with respect to congressional and state powers over in-

terstate commerce, without ever trying to fully identify and resolve
the conflict.

Similarly, Bork is inconsistent in his analysis of Congress's
power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. 65 On the one
hand, Bork acknowledges that as Solicitor General he had argued
that Congress has the power to pass legislation that regulates private racial discrimination. 6 6 On the other hand, in the book he ar58
59

R. BoRx, supra note 2, at 21, 27-28.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
60 See Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National
League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 123, 145 n. 85 (1985) (citing excerpts from colloquy between Justice Rehnquist and Solicitor General Bork during oral argument in National League of Cities).
61
The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
62
63
64

R. BORK, supra note 2, at 51-58.

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 156, 158.

65 The Reconstruction (or post-Civil War) Amendments are the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.
66 In a confusing passage, Bork suggests that rather than accept the Court's misinterpretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as prohibiting racially restrictive covenants between private
individuals, Congress could have outlawed such covenants as Bork briefed, and the
Court approved, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to prohibit private schools from excluding black
children solely on racial grounds). See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 153. Bork never acknowledges or explains, however, that Runyon involved an interpretation of Congressional power to enforce not the fourteenth but rather the thirteenth amendment. Bork
never explains how congressional power exercised to enforce one amendment can be
used to remedy an act that seemingly violates another.
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gues that Congress only has the power to enforce constitutional
guarantees as defined by the Court, which in his view has wrongly
construed the equal protection clause as prohibiting racial discrimi67
nation by private individuals.
Bork's contradictions result from sources he never acknowledges: tensions and conflicts in the constitutional text and inconsistencies between his theory and his service as Solicitor General. In
regard to the Constitution, Bork seems to forget that the constitutional text was frequently the product of compromise and that its
words contain no underlying singular meaning. 68 The framers and
ratifiers rarely, if ever, were united on the meaning of particular
parts of the document; they left tensions within the document, including, for example, its original stances toward slavery and federalstate relations. 6 9 To the extent that any objective understanding exists with respect to the document's internal tensions, it is that the
framers reached no consensus as to their proper resolution. To go
beyond that acknowledgment in the name of original understanding
is to disingenuously cloak one's personal views with historical
legitimacy.
In regard to personal politics, Bork's readings of the commerce
67 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 91-93, 147, 152-53, 324. For example, Bork insists at
one point, id. at 91-93, that Congress only has the power to remedy violations of the
Constitution (which, for Bork, can only occur through state action), but he later insists
that Congress may make the "political" judgment to prohibit racially restrictive covenants. Id. at 152-53. Bork also has a problem in explaining his current approval of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bork acknowledges that he originally opposed the Act because
it attempted to regulate the racial relations between private individuals. Id at 80. Bork
then suggests that the Act could be sustained on the basis that it does "more good than
harm." Id. However, Bork argues later that "because the Constitution addresses only
governmental action, the Court could not address the question of private discrimination. Congress did address it in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in subsequent legislation, enlarging minority freedoms beyond those mandated by the Constitution." Id at
147. Taken together with his earlier statement that Congress may only remedy constitutional violations as defined by the Court, this latter statement clearly implies that Bork
thinks the 1964 Act is unconstitutional. Needless to say, Bork never resolves the conflicts in his statements or his reasoning. Bork also never reconciles the basis on which he
would justify the 1964 Civil Rights Act and his theory of original understanding. Moreover, he never acknowledges that the 1964 Act was primarily based not on any of the
Reconstruction Amendments, but rather on the commerce clause.
68
TION

See generally LEONARD W. LEVY,
322-24 (1988).

ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'

CONsTrrU-

69 Bork glosses over the fact that the framers reached compromises on these delicate and divisive issues. For example, the framers purposely avoided resolving the slavery question in the Constitution but left its resolution for the future. Recourse to
original understanding for resolving the slavery issue is therefore futile. See Leubsdorf,
supra note 48, at 183. Similarly, the framers left a tension in the document between
Congressional powers under the commerce clause and the states' tenth amendment
powers. Since the framers and ratifiers agreed to include these potentially conflicting
provisions in the original document, Bork's use of the intent of those framers and
ratifiers to resolve the conflicts misreads both the document and its history. See id.

BOOK REVIEW-INTERPRETING BORK

1990]

1371

clause and the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments depend largely on the context within which he reads
them. As Solicitor General, Bork urged the Court to infer broad
congressional power from those provisions, but in his book he never
identifies the original understanding of those provisions. If he did,
he might find that the theory conflicts with the interpretation pre70
ferred by the far Right, particularly the Reagan administration.
Indeed, if Bork were to apply his theory rigidly to the commerce
clause and to the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments, he would risk either condemning his own actions as
Solicitor General or the far Right. Accordingly, Bork chooses to
condemn the outcomes of a series of decisions without clearly identifying exactly where those decisions went wrong. 7 1 He fails to fully
discuss the complex conflict between his public life, his theory of
constitutional interpretation, and his blindness to the conflicts inherent in the Constitution itself.
b.

Bork's Focus on a Conflict Between JudicialReview and
Democracy Is Misguided

Perhaps the major flaw in Bork's book is his major premise:
that democracy means majority rule and that judicial review is in
conflict with the essence of the democratic system. 72 Bork's theory
is misguided because it is designed to weaken the judiciary for the
sake of majority rule, which Bork mistakenly identifies as the central
aim of the Constitution. But judicial review need not and should
not be subordinated to majority rule either as a theoretical or structural matter, because the framers themselves deeply distrusted
"self-government" or majority rule as reflected in their implementation of numerous countermajoritarian measures (including judicial
review) in the original Constitution and in the Bill of Rights. Bork
either ignores or discounts all of these measures. 7 3 In the original
Constitution, the framers limited majoritarian power at the federal
level through such measures as prohibitions on Congress passing
70

ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION

SHOOK

AMERICA 90, 93, 157, 345-48 (1989) (recounting Bork's ties and allegiance to the far
Right); Barber, supra note 25, at 256-66 (critiquing Bork's judicial philosophy as explainable only in terms of its reinforcement of the far Right's political agenda).
71
See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 2, at 20-28 (suggesting that ChiefJustice Marshall
may have construed the commerce clause too broadly at times, but never explaining the
limitations original understanding would have imposed on Marshall's interpretation); id.
at 51-58 (suggesting that the Court misread or ignored original understanding in upholding New Deal legislation but never describing the relevant original understanding).

72 For an extensive criticism of this premise of constitutional interpretation, see
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 74-98.
73 Bork also ignores the historical evidence indicating the framers' antipathy for
democratic rule, including their purposeful creation of a government that was, in many
respects, clearly counter-majoritarian. See id. at 74-75.
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any bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, 74 indirect election of senators and the President, 7 5 a bicameral legislature with the decisions
of the directly elected half subject to review by the indirectly elected
half,76 dedication of the important legislative duties to the indirectly
elected house of the legislature, 7 7 and appointment to federal courts
of life-tenured judges78 empowered to enforce against the federal
government, inter alia, certain unenumerated fundamental rights
guaranteed through the natural law (or unwritten constitution) that
the framers never intended to displace. 7 9 The framers checked
majoritarian power at the state level through prohibitions against
80
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing contracts,
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,81 and the republican guarantee clause.8 2 In addition, the framers designed the Bill of
Rights "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
83
courts."
74

Article I provides in pertinent part that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto

Law shall be passed." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, c. 3.
75
Art. II, § 1. The Constitution also originally provided that "[t]he Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The seventeenth amendment
changed the process of electing senators: "The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years."
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
For the procedure originally provided by the Constitution for the nonpopular selection of the President, see U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cls. 2, 3. This procedure was modified
by the twelfth amendment, but not in a way that increased the likelihood of presidential
election through a pure majoritarian selection. See id. amend. XIL
76
The framers viewed the House as more subject to rule by factions and more
prone to hasty and intemperate action than the Senate. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 387, at 274 (Ronald D. Rotunda &

John E. Nowak eds. 1987); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-

LIC, 1776-1787, at 557-58 (1969).
77
The framers viewed the Senate as the half of the national legislature to which
they would entrust the more important policy decisions. See G. WOOD, supra note 76, at
553-54; MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1989).
78 Article III provides that "[t]he judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
79
See L. LEVY, supra note 68, at 351-52; see also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
80 Article I provides in pertinent part that "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
81 In pertinent part, Article IV guarantees that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
82
In pertinent part, Article IV provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .. " U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4.
83 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

BOOK REVIEW-INTERPRETING BORK

1990]

1373

Judicial review under the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights is a critical, indispensable element in the constitutional allocation of power rather than some deviation or aberration that needs
to be (at least substantially) eliminated. In fact, no part of the Constitution ever uses the term "liberty" in the sense in which Bork has
used it.84 Indeed, whenever the term "liberty" appears in the Constitution, it limits rather than expands governmental power. In
short, judicial review as an indispensable protection for the liberties
that the Constitution protects is no less important an element of the
constitutional design than majority rule.
c.

Bork Uses His Interpretive Theory to Restructure Constitutional
Allocation of Power

To the extent that a conflict between judicial review and majority rule either exists or matters, Bork mistakenly tries to resolve the
"Madisonian dilemma" through constitutional theory. Nothing in
the structure or history of the Constitution suggests that we should
impose on that structure some theory designed to resolve this dilemma. For example, James Madison perceived that the virtue of
the constitutional structure was that it pitted "ambition against ambition," that it placed one branch's powers against another's, producing stalemates.8 5 To the extent that we try to resolve or loosen
the blockages that the structure permits (and the framers anticipated), we undermine that structure. In trying to resolve the dilemma, Bork therefore not only must rewrite constitutional
structure through theory, but he must also take a decidedly nonconservative stance by arguing that we must err on the side of expanding (rather than restricting) governmental power. The way in
which Bork resolves this dilemma says more about Bork's values
than it does about the values enshrined in the Constitution itself.
The Constitution has said all it is going to say about the Madisonian
dilemma by making it possible in the first place. 6
B.

Problems with Bork's Historiography

Assuming that Bork can somehow transcend the textual
problems he has discounted or assumed away, his theory nevertheless cannot overcome five historiographical problems. First, Bork's
theory has no coherent answer to the problem that the historical
84 See Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist,
Chicago Tribune, Aug. 18, 1987, § 1, reprintedin The Bork Nomination: Essays and Reports,

9 CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 131-33 (1987).
85 THE FEDERALiST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton L. Rossiter ed. 1961).
86 An additional problem with Bork's theoretical resolution of the Madisonian dilemma is that it discounts, if not ignores, the fourteenth amendment's impact on federalism. See infra notes 94, 130 and accompanying text.
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record is filled with ambiguities, gaps, and contradictions.8 7 Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, for people in the twentieth century to recreate the framers' world. 88 Third, it may be necessary to
abandon original intent to deal with problems unimagined or unaddressed by the framers.8 9 Fourth, institutions may mean something
different to us today than they did to the framers; therefore,
originalism may be ineffective in governing our understanding of
those institutions' limitations. 90 Finally, the framers and ratifiers
did not construct the Constitution with an interpretive theory of
original understanding in mind. 9 '
1.

The HistoricalRecord is Filled with Ambiguities, Gaps, and
Contradictionsfor Which Bork's Theory Has No Answer

Bork's theory has no systematic, consistent, or coherent answer
to the ambiguities, gaps, and contradictions that fill the historical
record. 9 2 Since he has not modified his theory to take such
problems into account, he is compelled to take inconsistent positions. For example, Bork urges that courts should nullify the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment because
there is no clear evidence that the framers and ratifiers shared an
objective understanding as to its meaning.93 Bork ignores the facts
that (1) although the framers and ratifiers may not have reached an
objective accord on the meaning of this clause, they did reach an
objective understanding to make it part of the text of the Constitution and that (2) the clause was the focal point of the fourteenth
amendment debates that reflected an agreement on at least a range
of possible meanings of the clause. 9 4 In the fourteenth amendment
context, Bork reinforces his vision of a weak judiciary by ignoring
the part of the constitutional text (and history) that gives possible
95
constitutional protection to unenumerated rights.
In contrast, when confronted with the fact that the framers of
' ' 96
the first amendment "had no coherent theory of free speech,
87
88

See infra text accompanying notes 92-112.
See infra text accompanying notes 113-30.

89 See infra text accompanying notes 131-33.
90 See infra text accompanying notes 134-35.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 136-43.
92 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 43, at 34-35; Gerhardt, supra note 77, at 20.
93 See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 39, 166, 180.
94 See MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critiqueof a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 418 n.40 (1990) (summarizing the
congressional debates on the fourteenth amendment).
95 See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 166, 181-82.
96 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
22 (1971). In his new book, Bork suggests that he has abandoned as unworkable this
earlier article's conclusion that speech directed at the furtherance of political truth is the
only category of speech that should be protected under the first amendment. R. BORK,
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Bork suggests that rather than nullify the free speech clause, courts
should narrow its guarantee to cover only political expression that
does not include subversive advocacy. 9 7 Bork does not derive authority for narrowing the broad language of the first amendment
from original understanding, but from his judgment as to which of
the first amendment theories once announced by Justice Brandeis 98
comes closest to a restrained reading of the amendment's broad
language. 99
Bork also abandons his theory of original understanding in his
discussion of Texas v. Johnson.10 0 In that case, the Court held that
flag-burning which expresses political protest is protected speech
under the first amendment. Bork has a surprisingly feeble explanation of why courts could protect someone who burns the Constitution, but not someone who burns the American flag: "Marines did
not fight their way up Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima to raise a copy
of the Constitution on a length of pipe. Nor did forty-eight states
and the United States enact laws to protect th[is] symbol[] from desecration." 101 Bork's appeal to popular sentiment masks the fact that
in defending the dissent's arguments in Texas v. Johnson, he never
10 2
relies on, nor even refers to, original understanding.
Even where history may be relatively clear, Bork is not prepared
to embrace it. This is best illustrated by Bork's willingness to en0
dorse the Warren Court's holding in Brown v. Board of Education' 3
that state-mandated segregation of races in public schools violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Interestingly, Bork maintains that his own originalist approach best explains
Brown. The critical problem for Bork is that, as he concedes, the
framers of the fourteenth amendment supported segregated schools
supra note 2, at 333. Yet Bork also argues in the book that political speech (which he
never defines) not directed at the overthrow of government is the principal, if not only,
category of speech the first amendment actually protects. Id. at 301-05, 333-36.
97
See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 333-36; see also Bork, supra note 96, at 20, 29-34.
98 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring);
Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes J., dissenting; Brandeis J., joining in dissent).
99
Bork, supra note 96, at 23-25.
100
109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
101
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 128. Interestingly, Bork never relies on an even
stronger argument against first amendment protection of flag-burning-that flag-burning is unprotected conduct as opposed to protected speech. As Bork argued in his earlier article, one could claim that the first amendment only protects the use of words to
express political ideas, and does not protect physical action, since the amendment
speaks only in terms of protected "freedom of speech." Bork, supra note 96, at 28. The
closest Bork comes to acknowledging this argument in his book is his reference to some
of the justices who have in the past also opposed first amendment protection of flagburning. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 128.
102 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 127-28.
103
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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before, during, and after drafting of the fourteenth amendment. 10 4
Nevertheless, Bork argues that the critical question in constitutional
interpretation is always the level of generality the judge chooses to
state the intent of the framers and ratifiers. 10 5 He argues that the
equal protection clause embodies a broad principle of racial equality. 10 6 Segregation produced racial inequality, so segregation violates the equal protection clause.
As long as Bork is saying that one may ignore the actual, specific opinions of the framers and ratifiers, and instead rely on general principles, the choice of a general principle depends on the
interpreter's or theorist's construction of a fiction. There is no way
Bork can ever distinguish (or prove the difference) between what he
claims is really the objective original understanding or his own subjective distillation or interpretation of different historical evidence.
The framers and ratifiers certainly did exist but, as Bork himself
concedes, 0 7 never in the configuration in which Bork claims to have
found them. In this sense, the problem with original understanding
is that, as Professor Ronald Dworkin has aptly observed, "there is
no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be
invented."' 0 8 What is guiding Bork throughout his search for constitutional meaning is not so much the proverbial light at the end of
the tunnel-objective original understanding-but the light Bork
holds in his own hand, the size, quality, and direction of which depend almost entirely on Bork's own historically and socially conditioned choices, needs, and perceptions. Moreover, as a deviation
from the specific views of framers and ratifiers, Bork's choice of a
104 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 75-76; see also RICHARD R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 63334 (1976) (commenting that in 1868, eight northern states permitted segregated schools

and five additional northern states entirely excluded black children from public education); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 11-40 (1955); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understandingof
"Equal Protection of the Laws, " 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 460-62 (1972) (noting that the
Reconstruction Congress permitted the District of Columbia schools to remain

segregated).
105
106

R. BORK, supra note 2, at 149.

Id. at 147.

Id at 144; see also infra note 123.
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 477 (1981). Interestingly, Bork's choice or designation of and emphasis on the framers and ratifiers parallels a problem with interpreting literary texts. In particular, as Michel Foucault
observed, an "author" is in part what we take him to be-not an unchanging, stable
entity, but a fiction that we construct out of our reading and interpretation. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS
AND INTERVIE WS 113-38 (Donald F. Bouchard ed. 1977) Similarly, Bork's choices to elevate certain historical figures to the status of framers and ratifiers and to infer from their
statements a level of intent that they never actually had or approved is part of the fictional construct that Bork has made the guiding principle of constitutional
interpretation.
107

108
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general principle is no more defensible than any number of other
10 9
choices that also deviate from those views.
Interestingly, despite Bork's efforts to justify Brown in originalist terms, hard-core originalism requires rejecting the holding in
Brown. 1 0 Nor would that result have been indefensible in terms of
principled constitutional interpretation. The Court could have
taken the position occasionally urged by the NAACP that the equal
protection clause commanded rigorous application of "separate but
equal" principles such that each state was required to provide separate facilities for the races that were fully equal to each other."'
Such a position might have forced the states to eventually abandon
2
segregation as economically and politically unworkable."
2.

It is Difficult, if not Impossible, to Recreate the Framers' World

A second problem undermining the search for objective historiography is that it is difficult, if not impossible, for people in the
twentieth century to recreate the framers' world." 3 We inevitably
use the vantage point of our present values and social and political
situation to understand the past. 1 4 Our inability to accurately recreate the past requires us to acknowledge that when writing history, we understand better those past values or traditions that are
similar to or reinforce our present purposes, conditions, or goals.
Bork unwittingly encounters this problem both when critiquing
Dred Scott v. Sanford 1 5 and when defending the historical and structural bases of original understanding. To Bork, Dred Scott is the first
instance in which the Court used substantive due process to provide
absolute protection to an interest-slavery-that the framers and
109 Among these choices are: the protection of only the newly freed slaves and their
descendants from racial discrimination; the prohibition of discrimination based on any
immutable group trait, including gender as well as race; and the banning of discrimination against any class of people in positions analogous to nineteenth century blacks,
perhaps again including gender (or even sexual preference) as well as race. See Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 223-24
(1980); Dworkin, supra note 108, at 488-97.
110 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
111 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 25-29, 105-37, 159-60 (1987).
112
Interestingly, William 0. Douglas, one of Bork's favorite targets on the Court,
wrote in his autobiography that had the Court decided Brown when it was first argued in
1952-53, the decision would have been 5-4 to uphold Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). WILLmM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 113 (1980).
113 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 43, at 34-35; Brest, supra note 109, at 218-19.
114
See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 218-19 (1946); LEO MARX, THE
MACHINE IN THE GARDEN (1964); Georges Florovsky, The Study of the Past, in 2 IDEAS OF
HISTORY 351, 352 (Ronald H. Nash ed. 1969); Quentin Skinner, Meaningand Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIsT. & THEORY 3, 6 (1969).

115

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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ratifiers never endorsed.1 16 Bork's aim is rhetorical-he wants to
defame substantive due process by demonstrating its potential for
producing both good and evil results. Bork is surely correct that the
power that allows judges to read present values (such as abortion)
into the due process clause also allows judges to protect the propertied classes, as in Lochner v. New York," 1 7 or the slave-owners, as in
Dred Scott.
Bork's problem is that originalism requires a similar degree of
selective reading as substantive due process. For example, contrary
to Bork's characterization, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred
Scott was an unmistakable exercise in originalist interpretation. To
Taney, the issue was whether, at the time of the framing, blacks
could have been "citizens of different States" for purposes of establishing their right to invoke the power of the federal courts.1 18 Taney devoted ten pages of his opinion to a historical survey of
colonial legislation, the circumstances of the Declaration of Independence, and legislation in non-slaveholding states. He emphasized that phrases like "all men are created equal" could be
reconciled with the continuing acceptance of slavery only if people
in the framers' era did not regard blacks as men. 119 Taney's selfdescribed methodology sounds not like substantive due process, as
Bork disingenuously argues, but disturbingly like Bork's version of
original understanding. 120
There is other evidence, however, that blurs the clarity of origi116
117
118

R. BORK, supra note 2, at 28-34, 301.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 402.
119 Id. at 410.
120 Although Bork chafes at any suggestion that DredScott was an originalist decision,
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 301, it is important to listen to Taney's own description of his
methodology:
No one .

. .

supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in

relation to this unfortunate race... should induce the court to give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than
they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and
adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust,
there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be
amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it
was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in
words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the
[g]overnment, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to
the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it
speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was
voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule
of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and
make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426. It is possible that original understanding could be used to
reach a result different than Taney's. What is important is not the result of the analysis,
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nal understanding on the slavery question.' 2 ' The framers in 1789
had more conflicts over slavery and the status of free blacks than
Taney or Bork has admitted. Bork ignores this evidence in arguing
that the Court could have followed original understanding to endorse both blacks as citizens of the United States and the use of
federal power to abolish slavery in the new territories.' 2 2 Bork fails
to understand that
when all the evidence is assembled, what we make of [original understanding] will depend on the past that we choose to identify
....Originalism attributes our choices to people in the past and
so displaces our responsibility for constructing our society on the
12 3
basis of the continuities we choose to make with our past.
In addition, Bork selects out of history the values and traditions
he wants to perpetuate when defending his fidelity to original understanding. Bork seems incapable of fully understanding the framers' conception of the federal judiciary-he can only recreate the
framers' world with his particular agenda in mind. For example, in
defense of his use of original understanding to restrain judicial tyranny, Bork cites scattered comments from some of the framers that
the judiciary was intended to be the weakest branch. 1 24 But Bork
infers far too much from these statements. In fact, the framers and
ratifiers saw the courts as critical protectors of the people against
the most dangerous branch, the Congress, as well as against the executive (about whom they had ambivalent feelings in light of their
unpleasant experiences with the King of England).' 2 5 They gave
federal judges life tenure to secure the judiciary as a
but rather that Bork disingenuously tries to disassociate his and Taney's methodologies.
In fact, the methodologies are the same in principle, but different in practice.
121
Bork suggests that Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott correctly read original
understanding to reach a diametrically opposite result from the one reached by Taney.
R. BORx,supra note 2, at 33-34. However, Bork never acknowledges that both Taney
and Curtis tried to find the original understanding on the slavery question, which was
less clear and more complex than either of the justices admitted. See L. LEvy, supra note
68, at 277-78.
122
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 33-34.
123
M. TUSHNEr, supra note 43, at 45. Bork explains that original understanding
does not consist of the "subjective intentions" of particular framers but of
what the public understood ....All that counts is how the words used in
the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The original
understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary
materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like. Almost no one
would deny this; in fact almost everyone would find it obvious to the
point of thinking it fatuous to state the matter-except in the case of the
Constitution."

R.

BORK,supra note

2, at 144.

R. BORK, supra note 2, at 154.
See THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton L. Rossiter
ed. 1961); see also Gerhardt, supra note 77, at 66-67.
124
125
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countermajoritarian institution; they sought to offset the colonial
era practice by which the King simply replaced judges who disagreed with him. 1 26 Independent judicial review was important to
the framers, and they accepted its inherent dangers in light of what
it was designed to prevent.
Bork engages in a remarkably disingenuous reading of history
to infer from the framers' occasional references to the judiciary as
weak that the framers preferred self-government. He first suggests
that if the framers had anticipated that the courts would become so
powerful, they would have argued more about the judiciary's
role. t2 7 In a flight of fancy, rather than an application of original
understanding, Bork is imagining himself as the "reasonable"
framer. One could, however, read the relevant history in the opposite way: the framers' relative silence about the judiciary reflects a
general consensus on the benign check the judiciary would perform.
Second, Bork reads the structure of the Constitution as making
the judiciary weaker than either the presidency or the Congress.
The problem is that the Constitution says nothing about judicial fidelity to original understanding. In fact, the structure suggests that
the three branches should operate as checks and balances against
each other, with the judiciary's main tool in this process being judicial review. 12 8 While judicial review may produce the Madisonian
dilemma, 12 9 the structure of the Constitution suggests no answer to
the dilemma, except perhaps to allow blockages to occur until such
time as the parties can work out a solution.
Bork's third justification for original understanding is that we
have to invent an interpretive theory restraining the judiciary to save
the constitutional design. Bork's third justification is the weakest; it
presumes an understanding of the design and imposes a value on
constitutional interpretation that Bork has conceded could not be
derived from original understanding. Bork's argument about constitutional design is simply a restatement of his argument from
structure: either the judiciary is the weakest branch as a matter of
design (in which case the theory flows from the design), or the judiciary is not as weak as Bork wishes.
Bork's defense of original understanding also discounts historical studies that demonstrate that the fourteenth amendment was
designed to alter federal power-legislative and judicial-with reSee sources cited supra note 125.
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 154. Bork engages in this same disingenuous reading of
history when he discusses the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 180-82.
128
See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 73-98 (1969) (inferring judicial review from constitutional structure).
129
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
126
127
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spect to the states.' 3 0 Bork is able to dismiss or discount such studies by extracting from the historical record only those facts and
values that reinforce his present agenda.
3.

It May Be Necessary to Abandon OriginalIntent to Deal With
Problems Unforeseen by the Framers

Another historiographical problem with original understanding
is that it may be necessary to abandon original intent to deal with
problems unimagined or unaddressed by the framers. 13 1 Bork concedes this when he praises Chief Justice Marshall for abandoning
original understanding in his early commerce clause decisions in order to keep the Union together.' 3 2 Rather than acknowledge this as
a general exception to his theory, Bork criticizes the Court for abandoning (an undisclosed) original intent to endorse New Deal legislation. 3 3 Yet one could also argue that the Depression offered the
Court another opportunity to abandon original understanding to
save the national economy. No doubt, the exception could swallow
the rule, but the very need for the exception suggests a serious
weakness in the rule.
4. Institutions May Mean Something Different to Us Today Then
They Did to the Framers
A fourth historiographical problem with Bork's theory is that
institutions may mean something different to us today than they did
to the framers. If so, originalism can no longer govern our understanding or interpretation of those institutions' limitations. 3 4 For
example, Bork ignores the fact that the modern presidency is far
more powerful than the framers (or the ratifiers) intended or desired. 13 5 The framers and ratifiers relied upon certain values in consenting to a weak executive. The stronger presidency that has
developed over time is structured differently than the framers anticipated, and is derived from values and needs different than those of
130

SeeJAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,

1608-1870

334-51 (1970); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-53 (2d ed.
1988); Michael Kent Curtis, Privileges or Immunities, Individual Rights, and Federalism, 12
HAtv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 53, 56-60 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The
Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 275-77 (1984);
Kaczorowski, supra note 18, at 905-06, 927, 937-39.
131 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 43, at 25; Gerhardt, supra note 77, at 21 n.107.
132 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 21, 27-28.
133 Idoat 51-57. Although Bork criticizes the Court for abandoning original understanding, Bork fails to disclose~the relevant original understanding. See id.
134 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 43, at 35; Gerhardt, supra note 77, at 20-21; Cass R.
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 493-94 (1987).
135 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 723, 736-39 (1988); see also Bittker, supra note 52, at 274-80.
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concern to the framers. Because the modem presidency cannot be
squared with originalism, it makes little sense to use original values
in analyzing the modem presidency.
5.

The Framers and Ratifiers Rejected an Interpretive Theory of
Original Understanding

A final historiographical problem with Bork's theory of original
understanding is that the framers and ratifiers did not construct the
Constitution with an interpretive theory of original understanding
in mind 3 6 or they at least intended certain constitutional provisions
to be open-ended.' 3 7 In a glaring omission, Bork never discusses
the framers' original understanding that original understanding be
the guide to constitutional interpretation. A significant reason for
this omission is that the framers exhibited no such original understanding. Indeed, originalism commands adherence to the framers'
views, but, to the extent they spoke to this issue, the framers did not
want their views to be controlling. For example, in an important
article completely ignored by Bork, Professor H. Jefferson Powell
demonstrates that there is no evidence that the framers favored using original understanding in constitutional interpretation.13 8
The framers also purposefully crafted several open-textured
provisions, including the ninth amendment.' 3 9 The ninth amendment has haunted Bork throughout his professional life because it
conceivably protects unenumerated fundamental rights, judicial enforcement of which would seriously diminish the "liberty" of the
majority to do as it pleases.' 40 Early in his career, Bork argued that
the ninth amendment provided natural textual protection for
unenumerated rights. 14 1 During his campaign for the Court, he argued it should be nullified. 142 In his book, he argues it could be
136 See generally L. LEVY, supra note 68, at 350, 355; Brest, supra note 109, at 215-16;
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,
888 (1985).
137

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11, 15, 22-30, 34-36, 45 (1980);

Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory ofJudicial'Review (Book Review),
59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 349-53 (1981) (reviewing DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra).

138

See Powell, supra note 136, passim.
The ninth amendment provides that "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
140 See Kurland, supra note 84, at 132-34; Laycock, supra note 137, at 349-53; Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787,
805-12 (1962).
141 See Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968,
at 138, 170.
142 See Report of the United StatesJudiciary Committee Chairman's Consultants, reprinted in
The Bork Nomination: Essays and Reports, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 251 (1987) (citing Robert H. Bork, Interpretationof the Constitution, 1984Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture, University of Southern California, at 16 (October 25, 1984)).
139
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interpreted, when read with the tenth amendment, as leaving to the
people of each state the authority to protect or regulate matters
143
state constitutions or common law protected prior to ratification.
In short, Bork's personal politics have continually dictated his interpretation of the open-ended text.
C.

Bork's Problems with Stare Decisis

A final flaw in Bork's theory is neither strictly textual nor historiographical in character: Bork's theory precludes any coherent
or consistent approach to the Court's nonoriginalist decisions. According to Professor Henry Monaghan, so much Supreme Court
precedent has been based on a rejection of original understanding
that a true believer in original understanding has only two choices.
The first choice is to strive to overrule the better part of constitutional doctrine and thereby thrust the world of constitutional law
into turmoil; the second is to abandon original understanding in numerous substantive areas in order to provide constitutional law with
continuity and stability.144
This dilemma is of considerable magnitude, as demonstrated by
Bork's failure to cite any case in which the Court followed a theory
of constitutional interpretation similar to the one he has advanced.
To the extent that the Court has ever followed an originalist theory
of constitutional interpretation, its brand of originalism has not resembled what Bork regards as the "constitutional orthodoxy." For
example, even though Bork refers approvingly to ChiefJustice Mar143
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 183-85. Bork also argues rather disingenuously that if
James Madison had intended the ninth amendment to authorize the courts to protect
unenumerated rights, he could have done so in no uncertain terms. Id. at 183. As he
had done with the original role of the federal courts, Bork is again imagining himself as
the reasonable framer. The problem is that nowhere in the Bill of Rights did Madison
(or any of the other framers) feel the need to say in so many words that the courts
should have the power of enforcement. For example, I assume Bork would not dispute
that courts have the power to enforce the first amendment even though it does not specifically authorize the courts to do so. The ninth amendment tracks this practice when it
says, in relatively plain terms, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNST.
amend. IX. The term "rights" in the amendment is an unambiguous reference to those
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, including, for example, free speech. The remainder of
the amendment is a relatively unambiguous admonishment that "the people" retain
"other[ ]" "rights" not enumerated. Throughout the Bill of Rights, the framers used
the term "the people" to refer to the people of the United States at large rather than to
the states; for example, in the tenth amendment, the framers referred to "the States...
or... the people." The framers also used the term "rights" only to denote individual
guarantees against governmental power; they never used the term "rights" to refer to
the power of self-government. Moreover, perhaps Bork may have forgotten that James
Madison himself had no problems with the meaning of the ninth amendment. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of James Madison), reprnted in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 399 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
144
Monaghan, supra note 135, at 723-24.

1384

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1358

shall's originalism, Chief Justice Marshall construed the Constitution in light of its "great outlines" and "important objects" rather
than the specific understanding of its drafters or supporters. 14 5 The
electoral victories of Thomas Jefferson and his Republican Party in
1800 did signal the rise in popularity of an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation; however, this theory turned largely not on
the objective understanding of the framers and the ratifiers but
rather on the importance and primacy of states' rights as inferred
from the structure of the Constitution.' 46 Moreover, this originalist
theory never dominated the Court (except perhaps on the eve of the
Civil War). Throughout the remainder of its history, the Court only
rarely has exhibited institutional fidelity to an unchanging original
1 47
meaning of the Constitution.
Bork acknowledges that he must reconcile his interpretive theory with nonoriginalist precedents, but then suggests a theory of
stare decisis so riddled with exceptions as to be a meaningless restraint on judicial activism. In particular, Bork proposes three
guidelines for judicial review of precedent: (1) lower courts should
respect precedent more rigorously than the Court itself, (2) the
Court should never overrule any decision unless the Court finds that
it was wrongly decided, and (3) the Court should not overrule prior,
erroneous decisions when that would seriously disrupt well-estab148
lished government structures or practices.
None of these so-called principles of stare decisis produces any
meaningful deference to nonoriginalist precedent. First, Bork's focus is on the Supreme Court rather than lower courts, so his admonition to lower courts is purely hortatory and glosses over the
complex ways in which lower courts may bypass, tamper with, or
even challenge Supreme Court precedent. Nor did Bork's admonition count for much when Bork himself served as a federal appellate
judge. 14 9 Second, Bork has demonstrated that requiring a decision
to be wrongly decided before it is overturned is hardly a barrier,
since Bork has devoted almost 200 pages of his book to exposing
wrongly decided cases.' 50 Third, Bork argues that the only examples of nonoriginalist decisions that have become so entrenched that
145 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see also Terrance
Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1981).
146 See Powell, supra note 136, at 887-88, 931, 933, 937-41.
147
See L. LEVY, supra note 68, at 324-28.
148
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 156-69.
149
See E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 89-90 (describing Bork's attitude toward
Supreme Court precedent as a lower court judge).
150
The first part of the book is explicitly devoted to Bork's critique of the Court's
constitutional doctrine. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 19-132. The remainder of the book
intersperses critique of particular decisions with Bork's views of proper constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 133-266, 323-36.
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they should not be overturned are the Court's nineteenth century
decision upholding paper money as constitutional,1 5 1 and "certain
[unspecified] New Deal and Great Society programs pursuant to the
15 2
Congressional powers over commerce, taxation, and spending."'
Everything else seems to be fair game for reversal, particularly those
decisions recognizing a realm of privacy for sexually related activity,
including abortion. 153 Moreover, Bork emphasizes that because
federalism lies at the heart of the Constitution, justices should and
must be free to reconsider any constitutional issue in order to protect federalism.' 5 4 Since it is hard to imagine a constitutional decision not involving federalism, Bork's theory of stare decisis amounts
to nothing more than a device allowing him to do as he pleases.

151
R. BoRx, supra note 2, at 158 (explaining that overturning The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), would "overturn most of modern government and
plunge us into chaos.").
152
Id However, only Bork knows to what he is referring when he says "certain"
New Deal and Great Society programs. Presumably, he is referring to those programs
that were based on an expansive notion of congressional power under the commerce
clause, which Bork criticizes at various points in the book. See id. at 27-28, 51-58, 15859, 184-85.
153
According to Bork:
It was never too late to overrule the line of cases represented by Lochner,
because they were unjustifiable restrictions on governmental power, and
allowing additional regulation of economic matters did not produce any
great disruption of institutional arrangements. Similarly, it will probably
never be too late to overrule the right of privacy cases, including Roe v.
Wade, because they remain unaccepted and unacceptable to large segments of the body politic, and judicial regulation could at once be replaced by restored legislative regulation of the subject.
Id. at 158. Bork's notion that unacceptability to the "body politic" is a critical basis for
reversal is problematic. While I would agree that widespread dissent to an opinion indicates its potential lack of legitimacy, it may also represent the thoroughly predictable
outcome of the Court's enforcement of constitutional guarantees against majoritarian
preferences. For example, both Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
Texas v.Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989), have generated widespread dissent. Indeed, it
took the Court almost 17 years to take affirmative steps to enforce Brown, and even then
its decision to uphold such aggressive enforcement measures as busing produced perhaps even more widespread dissent. See R. KLUGER, supra note 104, at 750-54, 765-69.
The Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson created a firestorm, prompting the President
to propose a constitutional amendment to overrule it, numerous national representatives to condemn it, and seemingly widespread public disapproval. Although Bork defends Brown and criticizes Johnson, they are almost indistinguishable in terms of the
controversy they generated, except perhaps Brown may have generated more widespread
opposition. Bork tends to forget that, as a.countermajoritarian institution, the Court
frequently courts disfavor when it protects the rights of some minority whose preferences are frustrated in majoritarian decision making. To point to the majority's negative
reactions as a sign of a decision's illegitimacy is indeterminative at best and disingenuous at worst.
154
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 159.
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III
BORK DECONSTRUCTS

None of the recent commentaries on Bork's confirmation hearings, including Bork's own, adequately emphasize the four reasons
his defeat was significant. First, Bork deconstructed himself during
the hearings.' 5 5 As Bork was pressed to explain his philosophy of
judicial review, he exposed the inconsistencies and contradictions
underlying his philosophy.1 56 No theory that attempts to organize
or explain constitutional law in terms of some overarching principle
or set of principles is immune from inconsistencies or contradictions.1 57 But Bork made himself a relatively easy target precisely
because he claimed to have a single theory of constitutional interpretation that restrained the judiciary consistently and without contradiction. 158 Bork's testimony undermined the Senate's confidence
in his credibility because it was filled with abandonments or modifications of prior positions as well as of original understanding
itself.159

Second, the episode confirmed the Senate's broad power to advise and consent to the President's judicial nominations. In his
book, Bork demands that the Senate confirm only adherents to original understanding, 160 even though Bork cites no original understanding to support such a practice. In making this demand, Bork
ignores the text and even the original understanding of the Constitution as read by most commentators as clearly indicating that the
Senate has the power to take even politics into account in evaluating
a nominee.1 6 1 Bork never acknowledges that the framers entrusted
155 Professor Chemerinsky has made a similar observation. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitution Is Not "HardLaw
The Bork Reection and the Future of ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 29 (1989). Professor Chemerinsky argues that Bork faced an
inescapable dilemma: he could adhere to his earlier view that the Constitution was limited to the framers' specific intent, making his positions politically unacceptable, or he
could shift to a more abstract version of originalism, making him prey to the charges of a
confirmation conversion and forfeiting the constraint on the courts he had espoused.
Professor Chemerinsky maintains further that the dilemma that confronted Bork in the
hearings is also a central problem with originalism: either the theory is limited to the
framers' specific intent, in which case it leads to silly results, or it is based on the framers' abstract intentions, in which case it fails to genuinely constrain the Court.
156 See E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 241-60 (describing in detail Bork's confirmation
conversion).
157
For an extensive criticism of such "grand" theories of constitutional interpretation, see M. TUSHNET, supra note 43, at 21-146.
158 See E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 241-60.
159 Id. at 245-48, 251, 254, 259-60, 262 (describing the alarm and surprise of several
Senators, including Leahy, Heflin, Metzenbaum, Humphrey, Specter, and Kennedy, at
Bork's moderation of his views).
160 R. BORK, supra note 2, at 9.
161

See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787

REPORTED BYJAMES

MADISON 112-13, 116, 120, 314-17, 343-46 (Adrienne Koch ed. 1987) [hereinafter
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the Senate with special powers, including advice and consent, because they envisioned the Senate as uniquely capable of deliberating
cautiously but wisely on important issues, including the propriety of
the President's judicial appointments.162 Indeed, the framers' vesting of judicial confirmation power in the Senate is a critical structural safeguard against the so-called Madisonian dilemma.
Bork also seems oblivious to the historical fact that his rejection
was not the first time the Senate had evaluated someone's judicial
philosophy in determining whether to confirm a nominee. Previous
examples in this century include (but are not limited to): John
Parker, whom the Senate rejected in 1930 for following Supreme
Court precedent to uphold contracts that conditioned employment
on not joining a labor union;163 Louis Brandeis, who was confirmed
in 1916, but not before he had to wait through four months of Senate debate marred by anti-semitism and accusations of his being radical, anti-establishment, and anti-big-business;' 64 and Thurgood
Marshall, whom the Senate confirmed in 1967 in spite of strong ob65
jections on philosophical and racist grounds.1
Another significant factor in Bork's defeat was the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which resulted in the substantial enfranchiseNOTES]; see also LAURENCE H.

TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 97-98 (1985);
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS
TO THE SUPREME COURT 24-26 (2d ed. 1985);Joseph R. Biden, The Constitution, the Senate,
and the Court, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 951, 952-55 (1989). The Constitution does not

qualify the Senate's power to advise and consent to judicial nominations except for requiring the Senate to defeat such nominations by at least a majority. See U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States .... "). The delegation of such power to the Senate was the final way in
which the framers ensured vigorous Senate participation in the nomination process. For
example, before the constitutional convention finally agreed to let the President make
judicial nominations with the advise and consent of the Senate, the convention had on
four occasions considered but rejected giving the appointment power to the Senate. See
NoTEs, supra, at 112-13 (proposal made by Messrs. Pinkney and Sherman on June 13,
1787, for the appointment of the federal judges by the National Legislature); 116 (June
13, 1787 Report of Committee of the Whole endorsing Randolph's proposal to have the
National Legislature appoint federal judges), 120 (Patterson introduces his New Jersey
Plan on June 15, 1787, including having the Executive appoint federal judges), 314-17
(debate onJuly 18, 1787, on the locus of appointment power of federal judges), 343-46
(debate onJuly 21, 1787, on Madison's proposal to have the Executive nominate federal
judges with the concurrence of the National Legislature). In short, although the convention agreed on giving the power to the President because he was in a better position to
sift through prospective nominees, it never seriously considered a nomination process
without significant Senate participation.
162
See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 16351805, at 106 (1984).
163
See L. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 34, 90-91, 135; H. ABRAHAM, supra note 161, at
42-43, 200.
164
See L. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 110; H. ABRAHAM, supra note 161, at 178-81.
165 See L. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 133; H. ABRAHAM, supra note 161, at 288-91.
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ment of blacks, particularly in the South. 16 6 In purely political
terms, Bork would not have been defeated without the opposition of
Southern Democrats. Although the generally conservative views of
such senators made their opposition to Bork unlikely, civil rights
leaders made clear that the vote on Bork would be a litmus test in
the next election. A number of Southern Democrats owed their
seats to black voters' support, which could not be counted on in the
event a Senator voted for Bork. Thus, the voting power of Southern
blacks explains to a significant degree the Senate's political opposi67
tion to Bork and his ultimate defeat.'
Lastly, the hearings did not represent an affirmation of any particular judicial philosophy.168 The Court itself has, with Anthony
Kennedy occupying the seat originally slated for Bork, issued numerous decisions undermining any such belief.' 6 9 A conservative
majority now dominates the Court, even if it cannot agree on the
particulars of its philosophy. In addition, the opposition to Bork
represented a patchwork of interest groups and commentators from
a variety of political outlooks. 170 The opposition to Bork was more
united in counteracting an extreme (and extremely flawed) view of
constitutional interpretation than in endorsing any particular inter166 See E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 285-92 (describing the importance of the black
opposition to Bork in the South to the Southern Democrats).
167
The testimony of several prominent black politicians, including Andrew Young,
Barbara Jordan, and William Coleman, as well as of the prominent black historian John
Hope Franklin, indicated to the Senate a consensus among blacks that transcended
political parties. Particularly devastating to Bork was the opposition of William Coleman, who had been Secretary of Transportation under President Gerald Ford and who,
in testifying against Bork, opposed his own party's President. Coleman's opposition to
Bork was both powerful and unassailable: Bork had to give an accounting and pay the
price for his repeated opposition to the progressive majoritarian decisions of the 1960s
that favored minorities. Coleman argued that Bork was disingenuous for continually
insisting that majorities should be allowed to make their own policy decisions, except, it
seemed to Coleman, when those decisions favored minorities. See E. BRONNER, supra
note 70, at 277-83 (describing Coleman's testimony).
168 But see E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 344 (claiming Bork's "rejection... served as
a kind of constitutional amendment on the questions of civil and personal rights."); see
also Chemerinsky, supra note 155, 35-37 (describing Bork's rejection as a significant
"constitutional moment" in which the public both rejected originalism and endorsed the
notion of a living Constitution); MortonJ. Horwitz, The Meaningof the Bork Nomination in
American ConstitutionalHistoy, 50 U. Prr. L. REv. 655, 664 (1989); Morton J. Horwitz,
The Bork Nomination and American ConstitutionalHistory, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1029, 1036
(1988) (referring to Bork's rejection as "the functional equivalent of a national referendum on constitutional direction").
169 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 45, 48-49.
170 E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 185-87, 300-01, 348-49 (describing the pluralist
character of Bork's opposition); see also MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE
PEOPLE RISING: ThE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989) (describing
Bork's opposition as a rare coalition of interest groups, including those who favor abortion and civil rights, feminists, labor groups, environmentalists, and senior citizens).

1990]

BOOK REVIEW-INTERPRETING BORK

1389

pretive theory. 17
Although deception both in favor of and in opposition to Bork
tainted the hearings, 72 the Senate ultimately read Bork correctly.
1

171 To the extent that Bork's defeat can be characterized as a kind of "constitutional
moment" or event that shaped future views of the Constitution, the "moment" was
short-lived and not focused in any particular constitutional direction (with the possible
exception of the rejection of Bork's extreme and sometimes inconsistently stated views).
See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013
(1984). It is clear that as soon as Anthony Kennedy arrived on the Court, the Court had
a working conservative majority. This conservative Court has not hesitated to question
and limit numerous cases or trends Bork himself had vigorously condemned. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 45, 48-49, 52, 54-55, 57, 69-70, 73-74. Moreover,
George Bush's election in 1988 and nomination of David Souter as an AssociateJustice
in 1990 have guaranteed that the Court's direction will remain rightward and, therefore
more toward Bork's world-view than toward competing notions of substantial judicial
discretion or of a living Constitution.
Such as it was, the "constitutional moment" of Bork's defeat can be described most
accurately as affirmation of the Senate's power in a confirmation proceeding to consider
even the judicial philosophy of a nominee. It is, of course, more likely that the Senate
will be disposed to exercise this power when the Senate does not share the nominee's
judicial philosophy and perceives that the confirmed nominee would have a measurable
impact on the Court's direction. Bork's defeat does seem to have underscored in the
public's mind the importance of the Court's role in our constitutional scheme and of the
Senate's role in monitoring the composition of the Court.
However, Bork's ongoing criticism of the Court and his suggestions that he would,
if given the chance, like to turn back the clock on a number of settled issues, made him
an easy target for those opposed to any of his beliefs or conclusions. Interestingly, when
faced with another nominee-Anthony Kennedy-who might reach a number of the
same conclusions as Bork would have, neither Bork's opposition nor the Senate could
stop him. Indeed, Bork suggests in his book that he would have frequently voted the
same as Kennedy with two notable exceptions: first, he would have voted in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989), to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); second, in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989), he would have
voted to uphold state laws forbidding flag burning. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 116-17,
127-28. These exceptions suggest that the difference between Bork and Kennedy (and,
therefore, between Bork's rejection and Kennedy's confirmation) is one of degree rather
than of kind: Bork would have tried to shift the Court further and faster to the right
than will Kennedy. Viewed in this light, the "constitutional moment" was, at most, modest in scope. Kennedy's firm position as part of the Court's conservative majority and
Bush's election and nomination of David Souter foretell that the Court will continue on
a path that is in almost no way consistent with the outright rejection of originalism or
endorsement of substantial judicial discretion or of a living Constitution. As long as the
Court continues on its current path, it will be difficult to characterize Bork's defeat as
anything but a personal defeat and a victory for those who developed dislike for Bork
and his ideas.
See E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 99 (noting how Senator Kennedy greeted
172
Bork's nomination with a speech distorting Bork's views); id. at 150-51 (discussing
problems with the study of Bork's record prepared by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group); id. at 151-52 (describing the weighted questions used in polls conducted
by the press); id. at 160, 177-79 (discussing the distortion People for the American Way
made of a unanimous administrative law decision in which Bork participated on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); id. at 179-80 (discussing
other misleading ads used by anti-Bork forces); id. at 191-93, 196-98 (describing the
White House's decision to downplay Bork's association with the hard Right and to draft
a book making Bork look more like Justice Powell than he, in fact, may have been); id. at
241-60 (describing how Bork himself tried in his testimony to moderate his views to
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The hearings provided the forum at which Bork finally accounted
for the political choices and positions he had undertaken over the
years (and at the hearings) to help his own career. 173 Consequently,
Bork was hoisted by his own petard: he used politics to get the
nomination and then politics blocked it. Further, Bork's intolerance
for an open and honest debate of his constitutional philosophy and
of contrary views made him an unattractive candidate for the
Court.

74

If the Court's members are "inevitably teachers in a vital

national seminar" on the meaning of the Constitution, 175 Bork forfeited his chance to lead the seminar. His disdain for contrary
views, coupled with his lack of self-awareness about his inconsistencies, 176 made him incapable of perpetuating the dialectic process of
appear less radical); id. at 294-95 (noting Senator Heflin's focus on irrelevant personal
data, including Bork's religion); id. at 350 (concluding that "[t]he dispute over Bork can
be summed up as substantive debate with some slander."). Interestingly, Bork's book
never mentions the White House's strategy to portray Bork as a moderate, including the
book it prepared to make Bork resemble Justice Powell. See The White House Report: Information onJudge Bork 's Qualifications,JudicialRecord & Related Subjects, reprinted in The Bork
Nomination: Essays and Reports, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 187-217 (1987).
173 E. BRONNER, supra note 70, at 347.
174 For example, Bork recounts in his book an exchange with Senator Specter as

typical of both Specter's ignorance of the Constitution and the Senate's lack of interest
in Bork's real views. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 301-05. Ironically, the exchange actually
reflects Bork's own inability to engage in an open dialogue about the Constitution. In
particular, it shows that Bork wanted to talk about the Court's obligation to allow only
regulation of pornography and not of political speech, while Senator Specter tried to
ascertain whether or not Bork agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's conception that
some forms of pornography are entitled to first amendment protection. Bork never
gave Specter a direct answer but complains in his book that Specter did not understand
Bork's response. The exchange reflects both Bork's disdain for opposing views and his
reluctance to engage in a full disclosure of the substance of and reasons for his own
positions.
175 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character ofJudicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV.
193, 208 (1952).
176 Two examples illustrate Bork's tendency to speak out of both sides of his mouth.
First, Bork maintains that during his hearings his critics wrongly accused him of favoring
the kind of poll taxes that the Court struck down in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); he protests, "I have never said a word in favor of poll taxes."
R. BORK, supra note 2, at 324. Yet earlier in the book, in critiquing Harper,Bork refers to
Justice Black's dissent in Harper explaining and defending the state policies on which
racially nondiscriminatory poll taxes could be based. Id. at 91. I am at a loss to understand why Bork refers at some length to Justice Black's dissent (without a word of criticism) unless Bork thinks there is no problem with it. Throughout his career, Bork has
shown little disposition to avoid critiquing things he considers to be wrongly decided or
poorly reasoned and his failure to call Justice Black to task for his dissent can only be
construed as tacit approval. Letting Justice Black speak "in favor of poll taxes" hardly
established that Bork himself has "never said a word in favor of poll taxes."
Second, Bork complains that during his hearings his critics wrongly accused him of
voting against the grandmother in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Bork is absolutely correct that this was a distortion because Bork never participated in
the case. But Bork cannot stop there. He adds, "I have never written about it or even
discussed it." R. BORK, supra note 2, at 289. Yet earlier in the book Bork groups Moore
with the privacy decisions that he urges the Court to reverse, and he criticizes Moore
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constitutional decisionmaking.

IV
CONCLUSION: WORLD WITHOuT BORK

Both Bork and Senator Joseph Biden use the same scene from
Robert Bolt's play A ManforAll Seasons 177 to make diametrically opposite points about the significance of Bork's defeat. Bork uses the
scene to dramatize that liberals tear down the law in order to judicially enact the policies they prefer, while Senator Biden uses the
scene to illustrate that Bork has torn down constitutional guarantees
in order to promote his conservative social agenda.
These disparate interpretations of Robert Bolt's play say a great
deal about the process of interpreting written texts, including the
Constitution-what one gets out of it depends a great deal on what
one brings to it. My guess is that both Bork and Biden make legitimate use of the scene from Bolt's play in the same way that they
each use different techniques to interpret the Constitution. We
should not ignore or should not and cannot completely protect
against the dynamic interaction readers have with written textseven the Constitution-that permits different readings at different
times in different contexts. This dynamic interaction, or dialogue,
between reader and text as well as between generations of readers is
the essence of constitutional interpretation.1 78
itself as consisting of "pretty vaporous stuff." Id. at 118. As for the plurality's reliance
in Moore on "tradition" to define the liberty component of the fourteenth amendment
due process clause, Bork does not equivocate:
The judge who states that tradition and morality are his guides ... leaves
himself free to pick through them for those particular freedoms that he
prefers. History and tradition are very capacious suitcases, and a judge
may find a good deal pleasing to himself packed into them, if only because he has packed the bags himself.
Id. at 119. Interestingly, Bork's concerns about the "capacious[ness]" of history do not
preclude him from sifting through original understanding "for those particular freedoms that he prefers." The fact that the framers may have "packed" the "suitcase" of
original understanding does not make it more attractive because the most important
"bag" the framers "packed" is the Constitution itself, which Bork prefers to discard for
the sake of the smaller and more difficult-to-identify "suitcase" of original
understanding.
177 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS, 66 (3d printing 1962), cited in R. BORK,
supra note 2, at 354, and Biden, supra note 161, at 957-58 (1989). The scene features an
exchange between Sir Thomas More and his son-in-law Roper, who has urged More to
ignore, if not to strike down, the laws of England to get at an enemy, including even the
Devil himself. More responds:
Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
- where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not God's-and
if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
178 For the notion of constitutional interpretation as a dialogue between present and
past generations using the constitutional text, particularly its conceptual framework and
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Bork lowers, rather than elevates, constitutional dialogue because he wants to end the dialectical process of constitutional interpretation. Bork's intolerance for, and inability to participate in, an
open dialogue on the meaning of the Constitution is well illustrated
through Bork's use of another story. In the book, Bork relates an
anecdote in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes admonished
Judge Learned Hand that Holmes's job was not to do justice but
rather to interpret the law. Early in the book, Bork praises Holmes
for this admonition, 7 9 but later reprints with pride his own letter of
resignation to President Reagan in which he says he has achieved
satisfaction as a judge by "[t]rying . . .to do justice."' 8 0 Bork is

blind to his tendency to care more about tailoring his message to his
audience than about defining the essence of a judge's job. Nor can
Bork see the irony of his claim that a justice of the United States
Supreme Court should not strive in some way to do justice. It is
because of these and other blindnesses that the Senate condemned
Bork to return to the academy from whence he came. There, free
from the power available to federal judges, Bork may wrestle with
the demons tormenting him in order to find his own true constitutional faith.

vocabulary as the required medium and subject for discourse, see L. LEVY, supra note 68,
at 329-49 (describing the tradition of the common-law Constitution); Robert A. Burt,
ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (1984) (arguing
that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's adjudication ultimately depends on an underlying communal alliance between opponents); Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 90, 95,
99-100 (emphasizing the importance of disclosure and discussion of values pertinent to
the constitutional issue at hand); Frank Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of
Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 24-25, 40-42 (1988) (arguing that narrow judicial decisionmaking that balances competing concerns promotes dialogue within the legal community); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 10-15 (1979)
(construing the judicial function as the attempt to reveal or elaborate the meaning of
constitutional values through the dialogue of adjudication); Sandalow, supra note 145, at
1033, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1061, 1067-68 (1981) (describing the history of the Court's
constitutional interpretations as the process through which each generation expresses
and reinforces the contemporary values it holds as fundamental to the operation of
government).
179 R. BORK, supra note 2,at 6.
180 Id. at 319.

